

SWAZILAND: JUST ANOTHER BANTUSTAN? *

by

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1. Introduction

This paper analyses the relationship between the governments of Swaziland and South Africa in order to explain how it is that Swaziland has in recent years become Pretoria's most reliable and most pliable ally; why, in a period of escalating struggle inside South Africa and of the growing international isolation of the Botha government, Swaziland should choose to accord virtually full diplomatic recognition to that government by allowing it to open a trade mission in Mbabane - one which is, according to its Commissioner, "virtually an embassy in everything but name" (1); and how, at its official opening, the Swazi Foreign Minister could pay his South African counterpart, Pik Botha, the compliment of informing him that "he no longer needed a passport to visit the Kingdom". (2) In short, it attempts to explain why Swaziland has apparently crossed into the apartheid camp to join its resistance to the armed struggle for democratic change in South Africa.

The conventional explanation focusses on economic factors and South Africa's economic dominance of the region. It stresses Swaziland's land-locked condition and the transportation and trade consequences that flow therefrom; her energy, fuel and other forms of dependences; the vital nature of the revenue earned from membership in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); and the importance of the South African labour market. (3) These are used to justify a conclusion that Swaziland has no choice but to "play Pretoria's game". It is the price South Africa exacts for Swaziland's economic dependence.

This argument, however, is deficient in many respects. It is only a partial explanation and one that tends to mislead. If it constituted the whole explanation, then one would expect Botswana and Lesotho to have the same intimate dealings with South Africa for both exist in a structurally similar subordinate relationship to South Africa and are equally - probably more so - vulnerable to economic manipulation. Yet they do not and there is a qualitative difference between them and Swaziland in both their attitudes to, and dealings with, the apartheid government. They have not signed security agreements, have not exchanged trade missions and have not engaged in mass expulsions of the ANC. Both have appealed for the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions while Swaziland has taken the opposite position. Their relations are, in diplomatic terms, "cool" and distant, unlike Swaziland's. These differences illustrate that, even in the imperialist context of Southern Africa today, there are options and degrees of submissiveness and collaboration and that economic domination and coercion are not the sole determinants of BLS' behaviour. And the same argument applies to the use or threat of military power. Rather than actually determining the nature and extent of BLS' co-operation with Pretoria, what these factors do is determine the limits of what assistance can be given to Pretoria's opponents. Beyond them, they risk Pretoria's retaliatory wrath. A decision to co-operate with Pretoria in its resistance to the liberation struggle must therefore be a product of other factors.

The main focus, therefore, will be on "political" factors, but first the economic relations between Swaziland and South Africa - the constraining factor - will be examined. While here again the three BLS states share some broad similarities, close analysis reveals that the political economy of Swaziland contains some unusual, and some unique, features, while her colonial experience was very different and more like that of Southern Rhodesia (penetration by settler and multinational capital, land alienation). Swaziland is therefore a different political entity from Botswana and Lesotho and it is important to grasp this point because it has produced some of the factors and forces that have, in turn, produced the differences in the relationship to South Africa referred to earlier. (4)

2. Economic Relations

The South African involvement in, and domination of, the Swazi economy is enormous and growing. This gives Pretoria various ways by which it can constrain and pressurize Swaziland. These can be grouped under three headings: the presence and role of foreign capital; transportation, fuel, energy and water dependence; and membership in SACU.

(a) The presence and role of foreign capital

The Swazi economy is overwhelmingly owned, controlled and/or managed by foreign capital. Until independence in 1968 this meant British capital, with the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) as the main generator of investment into largely agro-industry (sugar, timber and citrus). Since then, British capital's domination has been eclipsed by South African and it is only in banking and agriculture that the British presence remains significant. Even this statement has to be qualified, however. Outside of the sugar industry, where CDC, Lonhro and Tate and Lyle are still the dominant actors, a gradual incorporation of major agro-industrial concerns by South African capital is under way. (5) It is also somewhat misleading to describe the Swazi operations of Standard and Barclays Banks as representing British capital. Through Swaziland's membership of SACU and the Rand Monetary Area, their operations are necessarily more integrated into the South African banking system than with those of their English parent companies. Interest rates, for example, are adjusted in response to changes effected by the South African Reserve Bank. Nevertheless, their top expatriate management continues to be drawn from Britain.

In manufacturing, mercantile trade, tourism and transportation, South African capital has a near monopoly position (6), while its minority stake in mining has been transformed into a monopoly by General Mining's (GENCOR's) purchase of Swaziland's asbestos and coal mines (7) and the commencement of diamond mining by a subsidiary of the Rembrandt group.

Increasingly, therefore, the Swaziland economy is an extension of the South African, and important "political" consequences follow from this. Collectively, South African capital is now second only to the ailing sugar industry as the biggest employer in the country, while it is also responsible for the "good life" for which Swaziland is renowned in Africa. In a context of rapidly rising unemployment and a 3.4% birth rate which is producing school leavers far in excess of the labour market's capacity to absorb them, any significant withdrawal by South African capital would have serious adverse effects - both in terms of the job market and of the living standards of the urban-based classes, who have become thoroughly accustomed to materialism and rampant consumerism. Moreover, both because its economic interests would be damaged and because it is politically vulnerable domestically, the Swazi ruling class will risk nothing that could lead to a reduction in South African capital's presence, and this includes not alienating the Botha government.

(b) Transportation links, fuel, energy and water dependence

More than 90% of Swaziland's import traffic and a large proportion of its exports flow through South Africa, and virtually all of it on carriers operated by the South African Transport Services (SATS), which holds a near monopoly on freight haulage. (8) The only alternative to transit through South Africa is the railway to Maputo, but since 1984 this has hardly operated, owing to the effects of Cyclone Domoina and MNR sabotage. Unsurprisingly, therefore, all of Swaziland's petroleum is imported by way of South Africa while, in addition, 70% of its electricity is purchased from ESCOM.

Despite Swaziland's membership in SADCC and that organization's objective of reducing its member's transportation dependence upon South Africa, and concurrently with a SADCC project to improve the road between Swaziland and Maputo, a joint South African-Swazi project is under way which will increase the integration of the two countries' rail systems. It involves the construction of a 120 km long railway from Komatipoort in the eastern Transvaal to the rail-head of Swazi Railway's southern link to Richards Bay in Natal. When completed in 1986, the Maputo line - whether open or not - will be almost redundant to Swaziland's needs. (9) This project characterises Swaziland's ambivalent attitude to SADCC - it will accept benefits the organization offers but will not deviate from what it considers its essential interests, even where those run directly counter to SADCC's goals. Here it is also worth noting that in the late 1970s SATS took over an assistance programme to Swazi Railways so that today "officials seconded by the SAR for service in Swaziland form a large section of the top management". (10)

While Swaziland has a number of largish rivers and suffers less frequently from periods of drought than most African countries, it does have a water problem. It has more irrigable land than water to irrigate with, and most of its rivers rise in the eastern Transvaal, an area where water consumption has increased dramatically in the last decade because of the building of power plants and Sasol II and III: e.g. the Heyshope Dam on the Assegai River, built to supply Sasol III, takes enough water out of the Usutu River (Swaziland's largest) to irrigate 3000 hectares. In mid-1984 plans were announced for a dam on the Komati River. The dam would be in Swaziland but the lake would stretch into South Africa and both countries would draw from the lake. The Komati flows back into South Africa and then into Mozambique, but so much water is already taken out by South Africa that it is often dry at the border with Mozambique at Nkomati. This dam will further increase the integration of the Swazi and South African economies and leave Mozambique ever more vulnerable.

(c) The Southern Africa Customs Union

Despite 17 years of independence and several development plans, the annual payout from SACU's common customs pool remains vital to the Swazi economy. In 1981-82 it constituted 46.01% of total government revenue. Over the next two years it soared to 61.05% and 64.88%, respectively, while the anticipated grant of E130 million in 1984-85 will amount to 64.23%, the slight drop resulting from the introduction in 1984 of a government sales tax.

SACU operates on a unanimous consent basis and the dissent of one party can forestall agreements. Not surprisingly, South Africa has most often used this veto power, and even against its Swazi "ally". The fate of Swaziland Chemical Industries (SCI) illustrates well how the South African government can, and does, use SACU and other protectionist devices to guard its economic interests, irrespective of the consequences to its partners. SCI was formed in 1975 to produce fertiliser and explosives for the South African market which, in regard to fertilisers, was monopolised - with government support - by Triomf and Fedmis, pillars of the Afrikaner capitalist establishment. They used their monopoly to produce high-cost fertiliser. SCI's intention was to offer cheaper fertiliser by using cheap ammonium imports from Iran. From the outset, the South African government, the Fertiliser Board and Fertiliser Producers' Association collaborated

to break SCI. First Triomf and Fedmis cut their wholesale prices to Swaziland to below those in the Republic, so that their Swazi supplier could undercut SCI. Then the South African government, per SACU rules, denied SCI potash import subsidies given to local firms, and then SAR refused to carry SCI's fertiliser. In 1980 and 1982 South Africa imposed further duties aimed at hurting SCI and then cut all import duties, which ended SCI's import advantage over the South African manufacturers. In 1984 SCI collapsed, throwing over 300 people out of work and leaving debts of over R60 million, half of which were owed to the local branches of Barclays and Standard Banks.

In 1983 SCI had accounted for 13% of Swaziland's exports and was second only to sugar as an earner of export revenue. Its collapse was a cruel blow to an already slumping economy. Even though this was a case of the South African government siding with "big" against "small" capital (SCI was owned by a South African group), absolutely no regard was paid to the needs and pleas of a friendly partner. They were ignored with imperialist disdain.

3. Political Relations

To understand these relations, an explanation of the Swazi political system and how power is distributed within it, as well as of the internecine struggles which have recently plagued the country, is necessary.

The system is a complex, diarchic one, with related sets of institutions - one known as the "Swazi Nation" while the other is the Swazi government, comprising Parliament and the Cabinet. It was here that the instruments of independence vested most constitutional authority but the King, as Head of State, was given the power to nominate sufficient members of Parliament as well as to select the Prime Minister, to make him more than a symbolic figurehead. In actuality, Sobhuza dominated the political arena from the moment of independence but, even so, resented the constitutional constraints on his exercise of unchecked power and, in 1973, he scrapped the Westminster arrangement. Power reverted to the traditional political institutions of the "Swazi Nation" which had survived the colonial period intact, even though their authority had been limited to that one-third of the land reserved for Swazi communal occupation and production.

This meant that Sobhuza exercised, by decree, supreme executive, legislative and judicial power, aided by a circle of advisers. Mostly these were members of the Liqoqo, then a small and near anonymous group consisting mainly of princes and chiefs but into which commoners could be co-opted. This arrangement continued until 1978, when Parliament was reopened but with its membership now emerging from an electoral system so designed as to ensure domination by loyalists to traditional custom. Its functions were changed as well. Stripped of independent policy-making authority, it was reduced to enacting into law the decisions of Sobhuza and the Liqoqo. Only weeks before he died, Sobhuza issued a proclamation giving formal constitutional recognition to the Liqoqo as the Supreme Council of State and expanding its membership to 16 salaried officials. None the less, his death created a huge void and three potential power centres - the Liqoqo, the Cabinet (then headed by Prime Minister Prince Mabandla), and the Regency of Sobhuza's senior wife, Dzeliwe, assisted by the Authorised Person, Prince Sozisa.

Factional strife was inevitable but not, or even mainly, for supreme state power. Two other elements sharpened the conflict situation: one, a legitimacy dispute within the royal family dating back to the controversial selection in 1899 of Sobhuza as successor to King Bhunu which had split the family into two factions, one loyal to the Sobhuza line and the other to a lineage headed by Prince

Mfanasibili; the other related to the fact that the Swazi Nation (read royal family) had developed a considerable material base through a development corporation called the Tibiyo Fund. This latter is particularly important.

Set up in 1967, Tibiyo has used its original revenues from mineral rights to purchase freehold land from non-Swazis, establish its own agricultural estates and other businesses and purchase equity in almost every important foreign enterprise in Swaziland. In so doing, it has accumulated millions of emalangeni. Moreover, its operations are free of public scrutiny. No annual statement is published, Parliament has no say in its operations and government gets no revenue from it as it is exempt from taxation. Control is by a board appointed by the monarch and has always included several princes. In fact, it is a source of accumulation for the royal family. Its operating style is to set up a partnership with foreign capital, normally by acquiring a 40% minority stake, or, where it has a majority holding, by signing a management contract with the foreign partner. In this way Tibiyo has spread vertically into all sectors of the economy as foreign capital's junior partner, and increasingly that partner is South African. So it can be seen that the material prosperity of the Swazi royalist rulers is heavily dependent upon the relationship with South African capital.

For years the driving force in Tibiyo was its general manager, Sishayi Nxumalo. A close confidante of Sobhuza, he often acted as his roving ambassador and, as such, travelled extensively in Europe and Africa and developed close ties to major political and business figures. An able and ambitious politician, he, however, lacked an essential ingredient for advancement in the ascriptive Swazi political hierarchy - membership of the royal family. In the view of many observers, therefore, his best political prospects lay in advancing from his Tibiyo base into the post-Sobhuza political vacuum. As a shrewd operator and with a pre-independence opposition background, Nxumalo was thus suspect in the eyes of traditional royalists like Prince Mfanasibili, who envisaged Tibiyo maintaining its function of bolstering the existing order.

The factional struggles of recent years, therefore, have been confined to the palace and have been for its domination and for control over Tibiyo's resources. State power followed from these as a matter of course. They have developed in three main phases. (11) The first, in early 1983, was little more than a preliminary skirmish and involved an abortive attempt by Prime Minister Prince Mabandla to shift the locus of policy-making power into the Cabinet and away from the Liqoqo. His failure led him into exile in South Africa and succession by a staunch traditionalist unlikely to attempt to alter the status quo of cabinet subordination. The next was more decisive and produced the deposition of Queen Regent Dzeliwe and her replacement by Ntombi LaTfwala, mother of the designated heir, Prince Makhosetive. A clash with the Liqoqo over the locus of ultimate authority was the ostensible reason but the real cause was the old legitimacy/succession quarrel, for her removal enabled the Mfanasibili line to seize the Regency and, with it, domination of the royal family. By this time a small clique around Mfanasibili was in control of the Liqoqo, from which most of the Sobhuza-Dzeliwe followers had been purged.

The stage was now set for a show-down between Mfanasibili and Nxumalo, and it began when, after elections for Parliament in November 1983, Nxumalo found himself removed from Tibiyo and moved sideways into the cabinet as Finance Minister - a prestigious but less powerful position. The Liqoqo's strategy seems to have been to remove him from his power base while not alienating the business community, whose confidence he enjoyed. Nxumalo, however, hit back with a series of allegations about corruption in high state circles, implicating Mfanasibili and some of his close allies. One related to a scheme which had defrauded SACU of R13 million in customs duties and into which the South African government demanded a joint enquiry and whose accompanying threats left the Swazi government no choice but to agree. At this point Nxumalo, accompanied, amongst others, by the army and police chiefs, convened a press conference to announce that the Queen Regent had

dismissed Mfanasibili and one key supporter from the Ligoqo. Within days the tables had turned and all those involved in the press conference were out of jobs and soon under detention and facing treason charges. A year later they were still incarcerated and with the charges still pending.

By mid-1984, therefore, the Mfanasibili faction had control of the palace, of the Ligoqo and of Tibiyo. Despite this apparent omnipotence, its political grip was distinctly shaky, largely because its ousting of Dzeliwe was regarded by a section of the royal family, and most of the Swazi people, as a violation of sacred custom. To them, Ntombi and those who had put her in the Regency were illegitimate usurpers.

In the course of all these shenanigans, Swaziland's political position had shifted significantly into alignment with Pretoria. This was manifest in two major developments in 1984 - the crack-down on the ANC and the decision to exchange trade missions. The assault on the ANC was explained at the time as being in implementation of Swaziland's Security Agreement with South Africa. This pact dated from Sobhuza's time but few believe he ever envisaged, or would have permitted, the grotesque spectacle Swaziland presented in 1984. He had had a long association with the ANC, his relatives had been involved in its establishment, and he had a cordial relationship with President Tambo. After Mozambique's independence, he permitted the ANC a low-key but official presence in the country and a blind eye was often turned to the actions of its guerrillas. His motive in entering into the security pact with South Africa actually had little to do with the ANC. Instead, it was his eagerness to regain "lost land" which South Africa exploited to shift him away from this protectionist position towards the ANC. The areas involved had long been claimed by Swaziland and the reuniting of the Swazi peoples was a life-long ambition of Sobhuza's. Hence his decision to initial a secret pact in early 1982.

Initial Swazi implementation was limited to the expulsion of the veteran ANC representative in the country - a serious but not crippling blow. South African agents then moved in and murdered his deputy. Sobhuza's death six months after the pact's signing removed a major constraint to those wanting a more vigorous crack-down. In 1983 the pressure on the ANC intensified with the killing of two alleged activists and the deportation of some 25 others. (12) But it was the Nkomati Accord which led to a "no holds barred" position. Swaziland's leaders seem to have seen it as legitimating their own collaboration with apartheid and they went public with their accord.

After Nkomati, over 200 alleged ANC members were deported, usually after periods of detention in which they were routinely assaulted. A few were killed resisting capture, while at least five appear to have fallen into the hands of the South Africans. As significant was the accompanying ideological assault which made it clear who it was that the Swazi rulers saw as their real enemies. The ANC was branded as "a scourge of foreign criminals" and President Tambo "a liar"; the media exhorted the public "to watch their neighbors" and to "turn in suspicious characters" such as unattached young men with foreign accents; a Commission of Enquiry into student disturbances at the University clearly articulated the State's view that support for the ANC and its goals constituted a "security threat" and was tantamount to a crime. It found "an unhealthy preoccupation with the philosophies, aims and objectives of the ANC", and this was used as grounds for the Ligoqo ordering the expulsion of the entire student leadership on campus (21 students) as well as two senior staff members.

At the height of their anti-ANC vendetta the Swazi and South African governments agreed to an exchange of trade missions. The South African mission opened in November 1984 with six accredited diplomats. Sceptics wondered why, after years of near friction-free trade relations, a new framework beyond SACU should now be required. The Commissioner himself provided the answer. "I see the work of the mission as going a bit further than promoting trade ... trade between South Africa

and Swaziland will look after itself but we can look after other developments." (14) Given the known presence in the mission of at least one senior officer of the National Intelligence Service, as well as Commissioner Sterban's description of relations between the Swazi and South African police as "good", and his statement that "the policies of both countries are reflected in the relations between the two police forces ... I think this is only to be expected between police forces of any neighbouring countries that have a similar policy" (15), it seems reasonable to assume that intelligence will be one of those "other developments".

4. Conclusion

By 1985, Swaziland's rulers appeared tied body and soul to the South African government, having moved beyond collaboration in the ANC onslaught to advocating some of apartheid's most important policy positions. In May, the Swazi Finance Minister criticised the disinvestment campaign and that position was carried into SADCC, some of whose members saw positive investment possibilities for themselves in capital's withdrawal from the Republic. Simultaneously, the Swazi Foreign Minister came out against economic sanctions and appealed to the world to "give South Africa a chance to sort out its problems. We have been really impressed by what South Africa has been doing for the last years trying to improve conditions in this part of the world, ... (South Africa is) on the right track as far as we are concerned". (16) Quite how he saw five years of South African destabilisation as improving the lot of the region was not explained, while his appeal for more time in a context of South Africa's murderous repression of the black townships seemed to express the Swazi state's indifference to the suffering and struggles of South Africa's blacks.

At various points I have suggested why it is that Swaziland has emerged as apartheid's ally but a more coherent and detailed explanation is now required. First, however, two preliminary points are relevant:

Earlier, in the introduction, I rejected economic coercion as the primary motive for Swaziland's co-operation with Pretoria. The same applies to a related motive - the prospect of material gain. While it may have been an early inducement (the possibility of additional land), the reality is that, in the years since 1982 and as Swaziland moved more and more into Pretoria's orbit, no material rewards were forthcoming. Indeed, quite the reverse. In fact, the Swazi leaders have good grounds for feeling spuriously treated, even betrayed. The "land deal" is a good example. It was the "carrot" which triggered the Swazi confrontation with the ANC. Yet, at the height of their vendetta, Pik Botha backed out of the "deal" telling the Swazi to negotiate the issue with the relevant Bantustan leaders, knowing full well that any agreement between those parties was impossible. Moreover, Pretoria then abandoned its attempt to abolish the KaNgwane legislature and instead up-graded its constitutional status, gave it an economic aid package, and designated the Kabokweni area a "deconcentration" growth point with some of the most attractive investment incentives in the Bantustans as a whole - well beyond anything Swaziland could offer. Located close to the Swazi border, Kabokweni could only increase Swaziland's difficulties of attracting new investors and accelerate the already steady flight to the Bantustans of Swazi-based firms. (17) Contemporaneous with all this, the South African government was engaging in actions which resulted in the bankruptcy of Swaziland's most lucrative industrial enterprise (SCI). With this record, it seems that all Swaziland's "good behaviour" earned it was a South African diplomatic mission and international derision.

The second point is that there is actually nothing new in this foreign policy of Swaziland's. Throughout its existence the Swazi royal family has revealed a tendency to co-operate with the region's powerful imperialist forces - Boer, British, Portuguese and South African. On four separate occasions between 1864 and 1876 Swazi soldiers aided the Boers in military campaigns against various indigenous

groups and, in 1879, joined the British in the war which destroyed Pedi independence. (18) In the 1960s prominent South African refugees, most notably Dennis Brutus (19), found themselves back in South African custody, while in the 1970s Frelimo refugees were occasionally handed back to the Portuguese.

The close ties to Pretoria have to be interpreted with these background factors in mind. They damage Swaziland's image in SADCC, the OAU, and the wider international community; they expose government leaders to hostility and criticism on the international stage; they alienate donors and deter potential donors, and they reap no economic fruits from South Africa. I am convinced, too, that the majority of the Swazi people do not approve, and identify with the struggle for black majority rule in South Africa. But all that is irrelevant to the princes who constitute the real state elite in Swaziland. They share with apartheid's rulers the view that Africa's indigenous societies should be ruled by their traditional aristocrats. While this may be a self-serving view in Pretoria, in Swazi royalist circles it is an unquestioned article of faith. However, the reality which increasingly confronts these aristocrats is that time is running out on this notion. The prevailing revolutionary forces coursing through Southern Africa have produced regimes (Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola) which represent class forces oppressed and exploited in Swaziland. Swazi royalty deeply fears these forces and developments, and particularly that they will one day produce an ANC-ruled South Africa. The regime in Swaziland is the direct antithesis of that to which the ANC aspires and Swazi royalty's concern is that an ANC government in South Africa would generate forces fundamentally threatening to their ability to cling to power. Thus, with the struggle against apartheid escalating and growing more militant, Swazi royalty has been forced to acknowledge that its best interests lie not in change but in the survival of the apartheid regime, a position which is reinforced by their economic interests as a comprador class. Tibiyo, with its links to South African capital, provides Swazi royalty with what is little more than a "slush fund" with which to enrich itself and propagate its ideological interests. (20) Thus it was no surprise that the Swazi Prime Minister should choose the occasion of his opening speech to the SADCC Council of Ministers' meeting to give an unabashed defence of the relationship with South Africa, giving it even a theological justification:

The Swazi people have learned from the greatest authorities that if one is to become prosperous he should love his neighbour as he loves himself. Regardless of the differences of political ideologies as pursued by your neighbour, you are expected to live peacefully with your neighbour. The Kingdom of Swaziland has had criticisms showered upon her in respect of political philosophy ... Today I want to make it clear that there is nothing wrong with our policy. (21)

From the point of view of a senior prince of an endangered aristocracy, he is correct. Not only is it not wrong, it makes sense. The Swazi rulers know well the fate that befell the regime of Haile Selassie. They know that time and history are not on their side. With the revolutionary struggle maturing in southern Africa, there is only one place they can look for succour - in the bosom of apartheid.

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*This paper was presented on 1st November 1985.

Notes

- (1) An interview with Trade Commissioner Sam Sterban, Business in Swaziland, December 1984.
- (2) Speech by the Hon Mhamba Mnisi, quoted in The Star Weekly, 4 March 1985.
- (3) Of the three BLS States, Swaziland has the smallest contingent of migrant mine workers. In 1984, it amounted to 14,000. This, however, represents about 15 per cent of the wage labour force. It is estimated that at least as many work illegally in South Africa, mainly in domestic employment and on farms in the eastern Transvaal. In the context of a serious - and worsening - unemployment situation, the South African labour market is clearly important, despite the relatively small numbers involved.
- (4) This theme is developed in Alan Booth, "The Development of the Swazi Labour Market, 1900-1968", South African Labour Bulletin, 7, 6 (April 1982), 34-57; John Daniel, "The Political Economy of Colonial and Post-Colonial Swaziland", ibid., 90-113; and Alan Booth, Swaziland: Tradition and Change in a Southern African Kingdom (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983).
- (5) In 1984 a subsidiary of Barlow Rand took over Swaziland's third largest timber company while Nestles' sold Swaziland Fruit Cannery to Zululand Food Producers, who thereby acquired control of a canning factory and extensive pineapple estates.
- (6) Wholesaling and retailing are controlled by South African firms, which tend to import and distribute South African goods, often even when local products (e.g. fruit juices, canned fruit) are available. Kirsch Industries (a South African group linked to SANLAM) operates the largest wholesaler (Metro), owns the country's two largest shopping plazas and several manufacturing concerns. The largest supermarket is OK Bazaars, a subsidiary of South African Breweries. Other South African supermarket chains are Dee Bee and Fairways, while another important wholesaler is Fraser of South Africa. The country's four largest hotels - two with casinos - and the largest convention centre are owned by Sun International.
- (7) Gencor's takeover of the asbestos mine ended the 37-year long involvement of Britain's Turner and Newall.
- (8) This monopoly is largely achieved by restrictive regulations imposed by the South African government, such as the issuing of new licences to non-South African operators and the requirement that goods be taken by road only as far as the nearest rail-head.
- (9) The Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation operates a storage and loading facility in Maputo harbour. It will continue to use it but could, from 1986, rail sugar via the new Komatipoort route. At present, when the Maputo line is closed, sugar is trucked to Komatipoort and then railed to Maputo.
- (10) J G H Loubser (SAR General Manager), in "Transport Diplomacy", lecture to the Institute of Strategic Studies, Pretoria, September 1979. In 1982 the South African government formed SATS to run South African Railways, SA Airways, as well as all harbours, lorry and bus services. It is now South Africa's largest State corporation.
- (11) Detailed analyses can be found in the chapters on Swaziland in the 1983, 1984 and 1985 editions of Africa Contemporary Record, and the 1984 and 1985 editions of Africa South of the Sahara.

- (12) The representative was Stanley Mabizela, who had been in Swaziland for 18 years and the recognized representative for five. His deputy, Petro Nzima, was killed in by car bomb in June 1982. Also murdered was his wife, Jabu - both were SACTU officials. Shot "by whites with foreign accents" in 1983 were Zwelakhe Nyanda and a Swazi, Keith MacFadden. Despite this murder of one of their citizens, the Swazi government made no protest.
- (13) Official Report of the Hassanaili Commission of Enquiry into Student Affairs, quoted in Africa Now (February 1985), p 25.
- (14) From a transcript supplied to me by a journalist - who wished to remain anonymous - of an interview with Commissioner Sterban in early 1985.
- (15) Ibid.
- (16) Hon Mhamba Mnisi, quoted in Economist Intelligence Unit, No 3 (1985).
- (17) Since South Africa announced the Bantustan incentives in 1982, four major firms have moved to the Bantustans, others have closed in the face of Bantustan competition, while Kirsh Industries abandoned an advanced plan to build a textile mill in Swaziland, which would have created approximately 1,000 jobs, and decided to locate in a "deconcentration" zone near the Ciskei. It is estimated that these incentives have cost Swaziland over 2,000 jobs in three years.
- (18) For details, see Philip Bonner, Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires: the evolution and dissolution of the nineteenth-century Swazi state (Johannesburg: Ravan Books, 1983); and J S M Matsebula, A History of Swaziland (Cape Town: Longmans, 1972).
- (19) While Swaziland was then under British colonial rule, there are published allegations that the powerful Swazi politician George Msibi collaborated to betray Brutus to the South Africans. See Jack Halpern, South Africa's Hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965; pp 423); and C P Potholm, Swaziland: the dynamics of political modernisation (Berkeley: UCLA Press, 1972), pp 107-108.
- (20) Tibiyo's funds are used to finance traditional festive occasions, like the Incwala Ceremony and the Reed Dance, and other traditional cultural activities.
- (21) Address by the Hon Prime Minister of Swaziland, Prince Bhekimpi Dlamini, on the occasion of the 1985 SADCC Annual Conference, Mbabane, Swaziland, 31 January 1985; p 4 of official copy of the speech.