Moral Fictionalism, the Frege–Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference

Kalderon, Mark (2007) Moral Fictionalism, the Frege–Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference. In: St Andrews Metaethics Workshop, 5 May 2007.

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One advantage of a fictionalist noncognitivism is that is not subject to the same semantic difficulties that the Frege–Geach problem poses for standard noncognitivism. But some, Matti Eklund prominent among them, have argued that the Frege–Geach problem arises in a new form for moral fictionalism. I argue that this is less of a problem than a reasonable query—a query that the account in Moral Fictionalism has the resources to answer.Lecture

Item Type	Conference or Workshop Item (Lecture)
Keywords	Fictionalism, Non-cognitivism
Subjects	Philosophy
Divisions	Institute of Philosophy
Date Deposited	08 Oct 2010 11:01
Last Modified	05 Aug 2024 10:20