

Memorandum:

~~(1) I saw Mr. Wallace at 5.30 this afternoon. I indicated to him H.M.G.'s agreement to the proposed conference on refugees in Washington, and that Lord Winterton and possibly Sir Herbert Emerson would attend. Confidentially he expressed the view that the President would be very delighted if Emerson could come.~~

(2) I gave him the aide-memoire about the reported arming of merchantmen in the Caribbean. He replied that the American Government was already investigating the question so far as it concerned Samara Bay, but that he thought that the rumour about Haiti was extremely unlikely.

(3) I told him that I had not yet had any reply about his informal representation about the search of American vessels for Germans. I added *informally* that my own investigations of the law in the Chancery had led me to the conclusion that under existing international law it was lawful to remove enemy subjects who formed part of embodied military formations and notorious enemy agents. He accepted the first view but reminded me of the Trent affair to which I replied that I thought that most people would agree that a man like von Papen was a more dangerous *person* ~~enemy agent~~ ~~than those ordinarily embodied in the armed forces.~~

(4) He told me that the Polish Ambassador had been in great distress to see him this morning, and complained that they had an agreement with Great Britain to send aeroplanes to Poland which had not been fulfilled and that it was understood that the Polish Ambassador in London had been informed that the bombing operations

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*Entered Separately*

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had not been inaugurated by the British Government for fear of possible repercussions on American public opinion. Mr. Welles said that there was no ground whatever for thinking that the American Government had made such representations, apart from the general plea against the bombing of civilian populations. He showed me a telegram from Biddle in Poland indicating that the Germans were bombing factories and industrial establishments without regard for neighbouring civilian populations.

The conversation then turned on the general problem of the war in which I set forth the present British view as to the probability of the war being a long one, and of the undesirability of weakening France and England for such a purpose in order to render spectacular and ineffective aid to Poland. He did not in any way dissent from this view. He added that he thought that Rome was the key to the immediate future.

L.

September 12th, 1939.

✓  
to you with the report <sup>1170</sup> L. 15/9

conversation with Mr. Welles on this

No  
L. 15/9

series?

Mr

15.9.

Welles 14/9  
 [Handwritten signatures and initials in blue and red ink, including "Welles", "14/9", and "19/9"]