

SECRET

*Soviet Union: Post-war Aims*

*6253/14/41*

December 23rd, 1941.

Personal and Secret

My dear Welles,

You will remember that at our last conversation I gave you the substance of the telegrams which I had received from Mr. Eden giving an account of his conversations with M. Stalin in Moscow. A few more telegrams have now come in from Moscow and I think you will be interested to know their contents.

In the first place, as regards Mr. Eden's general discussions with the Soviet representatives, you will remember that I explained that M. Stalin was insistent that any agreement that might be signed should include a reference to the restoration of the  
Russian/

The Honourable  
Sumner Welles,  
Under Secretary of State  
of the United States,  
Washington, D. C.

FRHM:HK

Russian pre-war frontiers. In a telegram dated December 20th, Mr. Eden reported that at a further meeting with M. Stalin on that day it had been agreed to postpone the negotiation of any actual agreements. Instead, M. Stalin had proposed that a full communiqué should be issued. Mr. Eden concurred in this suggestion, and I enclose herein a copy of the text of the communiqué as finally agreed upon. It would seem that it has also been agreed that this communiqué shall be broadcast at midnight, Greenwich Mean Time, on December 28th/29th, and that for reasons of security nothing should be published before that time.

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In his telegram of December 20th Mr. Eden stated that the meeting that day had been cordial, and in a subsequent telegram dated December 22nd Mr. Eden reported that his discussions had ended on a friendly note. The final talks with M. Stalin had been most satisfactory, and Mr. Eden felt sure that/

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that his visit had been worthwhile and that some at least of past suspicions on the part of the Russians had been allayed. Mr. Eden expressed the view that M. Stalin was sincerely anxious to conclude some definite agreement with the British Government. M. Stalin would, however, definitely not sign until the British Government recognised the Russian frontiers, and continued pressure on this question was to be anticipated. Mr. Eden added that meanwhile the positions of Great Britain and of the United States were completely safeguarded.

Secondly, as regards the Far East, you will remember that I told you that M. Stalin had explained to Mr. Eden that while he would be in a position to give assistance in the spring he was most anxious not to provoke Japan at the present moment. A subsequent telegram from Mr. Eden dated December 22nd reported a further conversation with M. Stalin in which the latter confirmed his previous attitude. M. Stalin had stated that a Soviet declaration of war on Japan would involve Russia in serious fighting for which they were not at present ready. Preparations were being made to  
replace/

G260/3/41

G260/5/41

P.S. You know most of this already from  
without, but I thought it might be useful  
to you to have our staff in order.

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In telegraphing about an actual bandage  
that they had the last night and which went  
on July 5 a.m. Eden says "Timoshenko who  
was present was most confident of Russian  
prospects in South East Asia and Stalin  
emphasized that in German morale"

replace the Russian troops now being moved  
from the Far East, but the necessary arrange-  
ments would not be completed for about four  
months. M. Stalin had gone on to say that he  
thought that from the point of view of Russian  
opinion it would be much better if Japan were  
left to attack the U.S.S.R. - a possibility  
which he thought very likely, though not just  
at the present moment but rather later on.

Mr. Eden pointed out to M. Stalin  
that in the meantime the Japanese might adopt  
the policy of dealing with their enemies  
piecemeal and that the next few months would  
be very difficult in the Far East. M. Stalin  
had then concluded by saying that he would like  
the discussions regarding the Far East to be  
resumed in the spring when the Soviet Government  
would be in a better state of preparation. He  
thought however that the Japanese might attack  
the U.S.S.R. earlier, in which case the position  
would be clarified.

P.S. (over)

Yours very sincerely, (SGD) HALIFAX

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that Eden had the last night and which went  
on till 5 a.m., Eden says, "Timoshenko who  
was present was most confident of Russian  
prospects in South. Both he and Stalin  
emphasise fall in German morale".

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23.12.41

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Yours very sincerely,  
(S) HALLIDAY

P.S. (over)