

**Evaluating Protracted Social Conflict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: An  
Analysis of the Challenges of the Post-Amnesty Peace-building Process**

**By**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The purpose of this study was to add to the body of research on the Niger Delta of Nigeria by investigating the perceptions of the people of the area about the amnesty programme and its ability to secure a lasting peace for the oil-rich region of Nigeria. The study set out to find an answer to the research question:

*Could the amnesty programme be rationally taken as adequate in bringing lasting peace to the troubled oil-rich region of the Niger Delta of Nigeria?*

The study tested four hypotheses that sought to consider some of the challenges that could beset the post-amnesty peace-building process in the Niger Delta region. Several studies (Obi and Rustad, 2011; Ukoh and Ukpong, 2013; Oluwaniyi, 2011) have in the recent past averred that the amnesty programme will not significantly bring sustainable peace to the Niger Delta region for the following reasons: the continued prevalence of small arms and light weapons in the region; the non-adoption of a bottom-up approach to the amnesty programme; and the failure of the amnesty package to meet the expectations of the ex-militants.

The accompanied discussion highlights the supporting evidence obtained for these hypotheses and factors that could be used to improve the post-amnesty peace-building process were suggested.

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## **1.0. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

### **INTRODUCTION TO THE CHALLENGES OF POST-AMNESTY PEACEBUILDING PROCESS IN THE NIGER DELTA OF NIGERIA'S SOUTH-SOUTH REGION**

#### **1.1. INTRODUCTION**

The Niger Delta Region in Nigeria has a history plagued with conflicts which has been a major socio-economic threat to activities in the region. The peak of this crisis was in 2007 and 2008 where there was an adoption of militancy with high levels threats of kidnapping and violence, guerrilla attacks, unrest and potential attacks on oil facilities. This affected the Nigeria economy as the oil and gas in the region represents 97% of the Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings, which is a major source of wealth for the economy. (Touitou, 2016: Page 1).

The region which is often referred to as 'engine room' of the Nigerian economy is highly underdeveloped, with high levels of unemployment and poverty. Only about 1% of the population in the region receive the benefits of 85% of the country's oil revenues (Touitou, Page 1).

To curb Militant activities, the late President Umar Yar'adua implemented the Amnesty Programme in 2009 as a way to bring peace to the region. This project looks at the amnesty programme as a conflict resolution mechanism and the challenges it faces to bring lasting peace to the region. The aim of this project is to add to the body of research on this topic by providing a critical analysis of the post amnesty peace building challenges by investigating the perceptions of the people of the Niger Delta region about the amnesty programme and whether or not it is sufficient to bring about sustainable peace. It goes further by looking at people's perception, it also looks at how amnesty was employed in SA and SL.

In analysing the post amnesty peace building process, this research project gives a historical background on social conflicts in the region, indicating the actors and major militant groups, the sources of these conflicts and examining the amnesty programme. It goes on to look at works of previous authors works linked to the amnesty programme in the literature review chapter, this chapter also discusses some theoretical explanations to conflict, analysing the human capabilities theory, greed and grievance theory and Ethnicity theory as a way to explain the root causes of social conflict especially in resource rich regions like the Niger Delta of Nigeria.

Following this chapter is the research methods which states that the mixed methods approach was employed in this research project. The research project adopted the use of case study to examine the role of Amnesty as a peace building mechanism in countries as South Africa and Sierra Leone where it was implemented. As part of the mixed methods approach, a survey was carried out through the use of questionnaire to analyse and make arguments as to whether the amnesty programme is effective enough to bring lasting peace. The next chapter is followed by looking at how Amnesty was implemented in South Africa and Sierra Leone and comparing it to the Niger Delta scenario. It also discusses the research carried out and discussed hypothesis This is followed with recommendations and the concluding chapter which argues that the amnesty programme can be rationally taken as adequate in bringing lasting peace to the Niger Delta region, however issues as exclusion of other important stakeholders, poor implementation and planning and corruption needed to be addressed.

## **1.2. Background of Social Conflict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria**

The Niger Delta is the oil-rich region of Nigeria and it is located in the South-South part of the country. Though Niger Delta was historically and cartographically made up of three states

which are presently known as Rivers, Delta and Bayelsa states but the list has been expanded to include Cross River, Edo, Abia, Ondo, and Akwa Ibom states (Ering, Bassey & Odike, 2013). The region is populated by more than forty (40) ethnic groups which include Ijaw, Efik, Ibibio, Itsekiri, Isoko, Urhobo, Annang, Ekwere, and Ogoni (Ering, Bassey & Odike, 2013: Page 422). The oil-rich region has a history of social conflicts and violent militancy that dates back to a period between 1877 and 1879 according to available records (Dike, 1956: Page 209). It was ravaged in social conflict until the federal government of Nigeria implemented the amnesty programme as a way to tackle conflict. The amnesty policy offers a non-violent resolution to protracted social conflict in the Niger Delta which is arguably motivated by resource control (Ering, Bassey, & Odike, 2013: Page 423). The essential features of the amnesty policy were aimed at militants who were expected to embrace peace by laying down their arms in return for pardon, offer of money, state-sponsored skill acquisition programmes and reintegration into the Nigerian society (Ikoh and Ukpong, 2013).

The social conflict within the Niger Delta is largely a resource-related conflict brought on by the degradation of the region consequent upon the activities of oil exploration companies and also by what the people perceived as the 'slick alliance' between the government of Nigeria and the oil companies to the detriment of the wellbeing of the people in the region (Ering, Bassey, & Odike, 2013: Page 422).

Though oil is a key factor in social unrest in the Niger Delta region, it is not the only source of conflict in the region. For example, the bloody Ijaw-Ishekiri war that took place between March 1997 and September 1999 cannot be explained within the framework of the adverse effects of oil exploration in the Niger Delta (Obi, 2009).

The report of a study on Niger Delta conducted by Francis et al (2011) and published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars identifies some of the main sources of

social conflict in the Niger Delta to include high social fragmentation, political economy of oil, flawed federalism, patrimonialism, and the weak capacity of the Nigerian state to protect citizens (Francis, Lapin & Rossiasco 2011: Page 23).

The social fragmentation of the entire Niger Delta cannot be overlooked when considering factors responsible for the continued instability of Nigeria's South-South region. The entire region is a patchwork consisting of over forty self-identified ethnic nationalities (Francis et al, 2011). These diverse ethnicities are further sub-divided into more than 120 groups with diverse dialects and are stretched from the coastal areas of the entire Niger Delta up to the upper land areas where farming thrives.

Afinotan & Ojakorotu (2009: Page 192-193) in their work identified three factors involved in the prevailing conflict within the Niger Delta. Firstly, the continual struggle by the Ijaw ethnic nationality for self-determination. Secondly, the activities of the various groups of criminal cult gangs established and funded by political godfathers for political and economic gains. They carry out theft of crude oil in several creeks in the region. These cult gangs also commonly carry out many other criminal acts like kidnapping for ransom and piracy within the coastal areas and beyond the territorial boundaries of the nation. Lastly, the activities of those who are genuinely motivated to work for the development of the region to free it from poverty and environmental degradation. The people in this category are neither militants nor insurgents but mainly people who are enlightened about the rights that should accrue to the region. These category of people cut across all facets of life and they include the traditional, political, the economic elites, and the intelligentsia.

The mobilization for violent uprisings in the Niger Delta according to recorded evidence dates back to 1966 when Isaac Adaka Boro, an Ijaw, led a 12-day uprising against the authorities and also declared independence for the Niger Delta Republic from the Nigerian nation that did not



materialize. Oil was at the center of this first uprising because it was discovered in commercial quantities in 1956 in the town of Oloibiri - which is now in the present day Bayelsa State - and the first export of crude oil was made by Shell in 1958 about two years before Nigeria gained independence from Britain ( Francis et al, 2011: Page 5).

Isaac Boro died in his prime yet the spirit of his first uprising lives on as it could be seen in the continued struggle of the Ijaw ethnic group to build a strong and formidable independent Ijaw nation through its military arm, the MEND (the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta). MEND spearheaded the transition of the Niger Delta struggle from a resistant movement to armed struggle and insurgency including kidnapping of foreign oil workers (Obi, 2009: Page 104). MEND was equipped with arms and ammunition and its men were illegally trained in military operations and commissioned to carry out attacks on targets owned by the Nigerian state in Niger Delta and its oil firm; the NNPC (Obi, 2009: Page 105).

Over the years, some of the avenues of conflict in the Niger Delta rose in number and include those between ethnic nationalities, within groups in the same ethnic nationality, within communities, among generations of people that have lived together for decades, between the Nigerian state and the community hosting oil rigs, and between aggrieved communities and the oil companies operating within the communities (Paul Francis et al, 2011: Page 16). Overtime, some of these avenues for conflict have become highly polarized as stakes were raised among the warring factions and in most cases, military wings were formed and dangerous weapons became easily accessible for use when conflict breaks out full blown.

By 2005, violent conflicts within many communities in the Niger Delta had risen to about 120-150 each year with many lives and properties lost in the ensuing mayhem (Paul Francis et al, 2011: Page 16). Armed struggle in the Niger Delta region reached a crescendo with

approximately 50 armed groups comprising about 20,000–25,000 armed youths brandishing sophisticated weapons during conflict (Paul Francis et al, 2011).

As a result of these conflicts, many people of various ethnic nationalities got killed with survivors abandoning their homes and villages in the aftermath (Obi, 2009). The state and federal Government also suffer economic losses through the decrease in oil revenues while the crisis last. The Nigerian national economy suffered greatly due to many factors relating to a decrease in oil production from the region or outright stoppage of production where the hostilities flare up. For example, when the Ogoni rebellion broke out in 1997, the entire oil industry lost about 117 days of work culminating in a financial loss of about \$1.32 billion U.S. dollars and subsequently, the foreign exchange earnings of the Nigerian government fell appreciably (Paul Francis et al, 2011).

In 2007 alone, Nigeria sustained the highest levels of loss in oil revenues when crisis escalated and MEND targeted Shell, Agip and Chevron; the major oil companies operating in Nigeria at the time. It was estimated that the country lost about 675,000 bpd (barrels per day) which represent almost 27% of the 2.4 million bpd estimated daily production as at that time (Obi, 2009: Page 106). Further details as provided by Obi shows that the data for the oil losses that the oil companies suffered in forms of shut-ins, destroyed platforms and pipelines are: Shell (Forcados Terminal and EA Platform), 477,000 bpd; Shell (Nembe Creek), 77,000 bpd; Agip (Ogbainbiri), 36,000 bpd; Chevron (Olero Creek), 70,000 bpd; and Agip 15,000 bpd (Obi, 2009: Page 106).

## **1.2 THE TIMELINE OF SOCIAL CONFLICT AND VIOLENT MILITANCY IN THE NIGER DELTA**

### **1.2.1. Early Communal Conflicts In Niger Delta (1877-1879)**

Many researchers including argue that the Niger Delta conflicts evolve as a result of diverse communal constituencies while others believe that the multinational oil companies extracting crude oil from the region are culpable (Paul Francis et al, 2011). While both views are arguably true, the conflict that occurred between 1877 and 1879 was influenced largely by an attempt to preserve their environmental resources from the invading Europeans. Specifically, British firms at this period invaded the interior of the region with armed boats in order to gain control of the palm oil trade booming at the hinterland of the Niger Delta to the advantage of Britain's own company, the United African Company (UAC). That attempt was resisted forcefully by the people of the region although they were largely unsuccessful as they were subdued under the superior firepower of the British company. Notwithstanding their inability to overcome, yet history shows that the Niger Delta people really aimed at frustrating the efforts of the British consul, Goldie Taubman, who was working towards bringing all the competing firms operating in that region under the control of Britain's own UAC (Paul Francis et al, 2011).

Part of the uprising of the Niger Delta people at this time includes attacking the factories of UAC located at Akassa, Patani, Brass, Idah and Asaba. It is interesting to know that history recorded that the King of Brass – an indigenous king in Niger Delta – was involved in the attack carried out on the Akassa headquarters of the UAC in 1895 due to the perception that the company was exerting exploitative monopoly in the region (Paul Francis et al, 2011: Page 30).

### **1.2.2. Recent Communal Conflicts in Niger Delta (1990s & 2000s) –**

The first recorded evidence of mobilisation for violent uprising against the activities of oil exploration companies in the Niger Delta was in 1966. That movement was led by Isaac Adaka Boro. That was about ten years after crude oil was discovered in commercial quantities in the Niger Delta. After the demise of Adaka Boro, there appeared to be some breather for almost

two decades. However, what again started as ethnic minority resistant movements in the 1990s to protest against the perceived injustices allegedly perpetuated by the multinational oil companies in collusion with the Nigerian ruling elites soon aggravated to violent agitation and armed struggle against the Nigerian state and its crude oil facilities located in the Niger Delta by the middle of 2000s.

Violent uprising became more pronounced towards the end of the 1990s and early 2000s. Available records shows that violent conflicts within many communities in the Niger Delta rose to about 120-150 each year with many lives and properties lost in the ensuing mayhem (Paul Francis et al, 2011: Page 16 ). Within this period, the level of armed struggle in the Niger Delta region had reached a crescendo with approximately 50 armed groups comprising about 20,000–25,000 armed youths brandishing sophisticated weapons during conflict (Paul Francis et al, 2011).

By 2007, Nigeria had started to suffer great losses in oil revenues when crisis escalated and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) targeted the oil exploration platforms of major oil multinational companies; Shell, Agip and Chevron. It was estimated that the country lost about 675,000 bpd (barrels per day) which represent almost 27% of the 2.4 million bpd estimated daily production as at that time (Obi, 2009: Page 106). Further details as provided by Obi shows that the data for the oil losses that the oil companies suffered in forms of shut-ins, destroyed platforms and pipelines are: Shell (Forcados Terminal and EA Platform), 477,000 bpd; Shell (Nembe Creek), 77,000 bpd; Agip (Ogbainbiri), 36,000 bpd; Chevron (Olero Creek), 70,000 bpd; and Agip 15,000 bpd (Obi, 2009: Page 106).

These intermittent violent uprisings led to the introduction of the amnesty programme in 2009 by the federal government of Nigeria. The primary goal of the amnesty programme was to offer pardon to all individuals that have been involved with insurgency and armed struggle in the

oil-rich region provided they laid down their weapons and embraced peace. Monetary rewards and skill acquisition trainings both in Nigeria and abroad were included in the amnesty offer granted to the ex-militants.

More recent conflicts in the Niger Delta have become much more sophisticated with lethal weapons deployed during uprising including the use of AK-47 rifles, remote detonation devices, night-vision equipment, and anti-aircraft missiles among others (Obi, 2009). A report by Ianaccone (2007: Page 2) shows that the best of the armed groups operating in the Niger Delta, often called militias, have attained a combined fighting capacity of about 10,000 strong men and equipped with more than 25,000 modern weapons.

It is important to note that the locals had the impression that they were being dominated and exploited by other ethnic groups who are non-oil producing. However, the successive governments at the federal level – until recently – interprets the activities of the militias as acts of economic sabotage and an affront to its federal might. On the part of the multinational oil companies operating in the Niger Delta in partnership with the federal government in Nigeria, they often see the agitation by their host communities and the subsequent attacks on their facilities as a huge threat to their investments and to the wellbeing of their workers (Obi, 2009).

It is to be noted that the exploits recorded by the militant groups like MEND were due to the involvement of some key actors. This will be discussed in detail in the next subtopic.

### **1.2.3. THE MAJOR ACTORS IN THE NIGER DELTA SOCIAL CONFLICT STRUGGLE**

As mentioned above, the strength of the insurgency that took place in the oil-rich South-South Nigeria and the exploits recorded by key militant groups in the Niger Delta were due to the efforts and the involvement of some key actors like Asari Dokubo, Ken Saro-Wiwa, Jomo Gbomo, and Ateke Tom.

In the first instance, the prevailing social conflict and violent militancy in the Niger Delta involves several militant groups (Ibeanu, 2000). The prominent ones among these groups as profiled by some articles and reports include the following:

1. Niger Delta Peoples' Volunteer Force (NDPVF) being led by Asari Dokubo
2. Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) being led by Ateke Tom
3. Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) being led by Jomo Gbomo
4. The Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC)
5. Movement for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSEIN)
6. Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) founded by Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1992 with others of like minds.

The first three groups, the NDPVF, NDV, and MEND are commonly regarded as the main militia groups in the Niger Delta. However, out of the three mentioned, MEND is the most noted group. The MOSOP championed by Saro-Wiwa in 1990s is generally regarded as a peaceful, non-violent group that operated more like the strategies adopted by Mahatma Gandhi decades ago (Ibeanu, 2000: Page 28).

Prior to the moment of his execution, Saro-Wiwa, a successful writer and TV producer won the Right Livelihood Award and the Goldman Environmental Prize for his activism on environmental issues in his native Ogoni land in the Niger Delta. Saro-Wiwa was a major voice against the activities of Shell Oil Company that led to the degradation of the entire environment in Ogoniland of the Niger Delta. In many of his writings, Saro-Wiwa relentlessly put the blame of the environmental degradations within Ogoniland at the doorstep of Shell. In one instance, Ken likened the activities of Shell in Niger Delta to genocide and murdering the soul of the people of the land (Saro-Wiwa, 1992: Page 75). In another instance, Ken claimed that the

Ogoni people of Niger Delta have been compelled to sacrifice all necessities that support life so that the entire country could reap economic prosperity (Saro-Wiwa, 1992: Page 47).

Ken Saro-Wiwa pursued a demand for compensation for the farmlands and fisheries lost by his Ogoni people caused by the operations of the oil companies particularly Shell and Chevron. Saro-Wiwa was tenacious in his determination to redress the perceived economic and political wrongs imposed on his Niger Delta people though he had the opportunity to join some other elites within the Niger Delta region whose main interests lie in securing 'highly rewarding' positions within the government and/or contracts from the oil companies as it was the usual practice then (Saro-Wiwa, 1992).

Unfortunately for Saro-Wiwa, the federal government of Nigeria under the despotic and repressive leadership of the military ruler, General Sanni Abacha, executed him and eight others by hanging in 1995 for an unfathomed charge of the murder of four Ogoni elders without a fair hearing as depicted by the walk-away staged by his defence lawyers during the trial. The government of General Sanni Abacha ignored the overwhelming outcry mounted internationally against the execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight others (Francis et al, 2011). The execution of Saro-Wiwa led to Nigeria being suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations for a period of over three years (Francis et al, 2011).

Compared with MOSOP which has not been known for armed struggle, NDPVF, NDV and MEND have at various times been fingered for operating a secretive number of vicious and armed gang often involved with attacks on oil pumping stations, and oil platforms. In the process of carrying out insurgent attacks, these groups often operate as hooded criminals killing soldiers and other security personnel, setting off bombs when necessary and they also often kidnap foreign oil workers to claim ransom (Francis et al, 2011).

Many other militant groups also exist but are mainly focused on working underground causing security threats in the process as they carry out criminal tendencies like theft of crude oil. Sometimes, these militants make use of sophisticated weapons, explosives, and arms proliferation among other criminal activities they often carry out in the Niger Delta creeks (Obi, 2009). All the key actors and groups involved in the struggle for the emancipation of Niger Delta, whether driven by genuine interest for the progress of the region or for pecuniary benefits, hid under the pretext that the land and the environment of the oil-rich region have been degraded and polluted by oil spills.

### **1.3. THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE NIGER DELTA OF NIGERIA**

Issues of environmental degradation of the entire communities hosting activities of oil companies have been the major driving force behind social conflicts and uprisings between the host communities and the oil companies. For several decades, oil companies have operated in the Niger Delta without any regards for the negative effects on the populations of the people dwelling in the host communities. For example, the entire region of the Niger Delta is being regarded as one of the five most degraded environments in the world with huge petroleum pollution (Obi, 2010: Page 110).

The overall effects of the polluted environment could be seen in the level of health hazards the rural dwellers of the Niger Delta people face and the destruction of the means of livelihood of the largely agrarian society. In some instances, oil companies opt for the evacuation of the people within the host community due to extensive pollution meaning they are being taken from their homelands to another area leading to further marginalization (Francis et al, 2011).

With the level of civilization in the world, it should not have been difficult for environmental regulations commonly applicable in societies where rules and regulations are enforced to be



applied in the Niger Delta of Nigeria but such was not the case. Also, it is appropriate to ask for why the successive Nigerian governments failed to make sure oil companies keep to the normal environmental regulations that goes with their operations. It can be said that the basis of this large scale neglect of the Niger Delta environments to degradation and pollution was either deliberate or fuelled by political and economic corruption.

Some common practices that negate professional practice in oil and gas explorations include gas flaring, oil spillage leading to extensive pollution of water, bush burnings, and emission of dangerous gases like carbon monoxide to the atmosphere. A research report shows that gas is flared in about 70% of the oil fields in the Niger Delta on a daily basis resulting in a huge quantity of carbon monoxide being released to the atmosphere (Francis et al, 2011). With severe damage done to the soil, water, fish farms, and farmlands of the local people of the Niger Delta, socio-economic hardships are being inflicted on a daily basis.

Vast oil exploration activities of oil companies often culminate in extreme environmental degradation leading to resentments in the ever growing youth population of the Niger Delta towards the Nigerian state and its political cum economic structures. These youths often try to tie their impoverishment to the nonchalant attitudes of both government and the multinational oil companies operating within the host communities of the local people (Obi, 2009). The youths became enchanted and took on their local elites describing them as people who feel comfortable drinking beer while the larger populations of people are confined to drinking muddy water (Obi, 2009).

The social consequence of the environmental degradation of the Niger Delta produces the following:

- Extreme Social Conflicts, Restiveness and Youth Militancy
- Hostage Taking and Kidnapping for Ransom

- Suppression by the State and Outright Violence against the State
- Extreme cases of Inter-Communal Crisis
- Absolute Breakdown of Cultural Norms and Values
- Theft of Crude Oil and Economic Sabotage aimed against the State
- Increased level of poverty and Destitution of the natives
- Underdevelopment of the Huge Human Resources in the Region (Obi, 2009;

Francis et al, 2011).

All these social consequences came mainly because the successive federal governments in Nigeria failed to protect the host communities and their environment. Perhaps, this was because of political and/or pecuniary interest – to address the issues of substandard operational policy by which the oil companies conduct their exploration and oil and gas business. Oil-barrel politics is undoubtedly at the heart of the troubles the entire Niger Delta region has been going through in the past five decades after crude oil was discovered in commercial quantities in the Niger Delta of Nigeria (Obi, 2009).

It is about the right time to discuss the different perceptions of Nigerians about the groups of militias involved with the Niger Delta struggle and the key motivating factors of these groups.

#### **1.4. MILITIAS IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION OF NIGERIA – PERCEPTIONS OF NIGERIANS ABOUT THE GROUPS AND THEIR MISSIONS**

Attempts have been made to categorize the armed men behind the Niger Delta struggle by using different name tags that suggests that the men behind the armed struggle in this region are either freedom fighters or mere criminals. Names such as insurgents, terrorists, cult and

gang members, rebels, freedom fighters, criminals, revolutionaries, have been used to refer to these armed men on different occasions by different people.

In the context of the Niger Delta, the term 'militants' often connotes a broad range of meanings which include gunmen or armed men "who make political and cash demands" (Osaghae et al., 2011: Page 19).

Some Ijaw leaders such as Edwin Clark refers to these men behind the Niger Delta armed struggle as freedom fighters on the pretext that they were involved in a struggle for justice and freedom not for themselves but for millions of their ethnic people (Osaghae et al, 2011). Community leaders who hold this opinion argue that the deplorable situation in the Niger Delta like the extreme level of poverty, diseases, high level of illiteracy and unemployment among the people is unwarranted considering the huge oil revenues that have accrued to the national treasury of Nigeria from exporting its high quality oil often referred to as the "sweet crude" of the Niger Delta. Some experts have suggested that the crude oil from the Niger Delta yield high quality distillates like liquefied petroleum gas, naphtha and gasoline among others because it has low hydrogen sulphide and carbon dioxide (Osaghae et al., 2011).

The pro-militancy people in the Niger Delta refer to the militants in the region as freedom fighters. They also claim that beside not benefitting from the huge revenues derived from the region, the natural habitats and the environment of the people in the region have been destroyed or contaminated leading to serious economic consequences and the average mortality rate of the people of the region declining to 40 years (Osaghae et al., 2011).

The Niger Delta region which is mainly populated with people whose occupations are mainly farming, fishing and hunting now live on edge because their means of livelihood have been destroyed due to the activities of the multinational oil companies that have shown little or no regard for their environment (Obi, 2009). The Niger Delta region was once regarded as the

‘agricultural pride’ of West Africa due to its vast agricultural resources like fertile land which was good for farming, fish and sundry water-based creatures commonly found in rivers, creeks and coastal waters (Francis et al., 2011). The region has now become one of the most polluted places on earth so that the Niger Delta region could be regarded as one of the poorest in the Nigerian nation.

Perhaps holding this view could help distinguish genuine militants from those criminal elements motivated by greed. Indeed, while there are those men commonly believed to be fighting the just cause of the Niger Delta, there have been several criminally minded men motivated by the pecuniary benefits they could gain by being involved in armed struggle against the state of Nigeria (Osaghae et al., 2011).

The demand of these gunmen often includes the release of their imprisoned leaders. When they make cash demands, such often relates to the reparations for communities they considered to have been unduly exploited by the activities of the multinational oil companies. In some instances, these armed men also placed a demand for a change of electoral candidates they considered not sympathetic to the cause of their region (Ianaccone, 2007).

Generally, these gunmen place a demand for a greater share of oil revenues that accrues to national treasury from the sale of Niger Delta crude oil (Osaghae et al., 2011). The main distinguishing factor between Niger Delta militants that are ‘‘freedom fighters’’ and those who were mostly criminal minded and kidnap their targets for money is the political demands they make (Obi, 2009). Also, true militants in the Niger Delta are also distinct from communities that often show disaffections to government policies. While such communities may carry out attacks or kidnap their targets with the hope that they could get some public amenities such as a clinic, school or even some token as cash settlements, they do not really have any tangible political demands (Osaghae et al., 2011).

In essence, there are two broad categories of youth militias in the Niger Delta (Ikelegbe, 2011). The two are genuine militants and the criminalized militants. According to Ikelegbe (2011), militias that operate in the Niger Delta with criminal intentions do so mainly as gunmen in small cults and gangs. However, though the motivation to recourse to violence may be used to distinguish a genuine militia group from a criminalized militant group or cult, it is somewhat difficult to differentiate between the two groups as they often show similar features under certain circumstances according to Ikelegbe (2011).

While criminalized elements in cults and gangs primarily engaged in illegal economic activities such as oil bunkering for the financial benefits they always derived, genuine militants also engage in such activities to source for funds to finance their struggle (Ikelegbe, 2011). Other inimical activities commonly indulged in by various armed groups in the Niger Delta includes kidnapping for cash benefits or ransom, armed robbery, political thuggery, dealing in illicit drugs, and piracy. Ikelegbe (2011) observes that genuine militants also engage in these activities but where they do, it is to support a specific cause of action. Ikelegbe (2011) notes that the broad nature of the alliance of insurgent militias and the not too distinct boundaries between them and the criminalized elements give room for some illegal activities being carried out under the guise of working in support of the Niger Delta causes. When this happens, various criminal acts are perpetuated most of which bring disrepute to the image of the struggle and lend credence to the voice of those who believe that all militants are criminals. Notwithstanding the intermingling of some criminal minded elements in the genuine struggle for the emancipation of the Niger Delta region, government saw the need to introduce amnesty and offer pardon to all armed men and militants in the oil-rich South-South.

## **1.5. THE BACKGROUND OF THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT'S AMNESTY INITIATIVES FOR NIGER DELTA MILITANTS**

The amnesty program for the ex-combatants of the Niger Delta was the initiative of the late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua's administration after several attempts made by previous successive Nigerian governments failed to bring any appreciable level of peace to the troubled oil producing region (Francis et al., 2011). Some of the initiatives of the previous governments at developing the Niger Delta of Nigeria and calm tension started as far back as 1961 when the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) was established. The establishment of several other state institutions and programs followed in quick succession. These include the Niger Delta Basin and Rural Development Authority (NDBRDA) which was established by Decree 37 in 1976. In 1992, the Decree 23 was enacted to establish the OMPADEC and this was followed by the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) in 1996 (Francis et al., 2011).

In 2000, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was set up by an act of the parliament (Francis et al., 2011). In 2009, a separate ministry was established in the Federal Civil Service to look after the development of this troubled region and was christened the Ministry of the Niger Delta of Nigeria. In 2010, and the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) was established (Francis et al., 2011). Also, Delta State and Ondo State had separately established oil producing areas development commissions (DESOPADEC and OSOPADEC respectively) to tackle the problem of underdevelopment and environmental degradation brought on by the explorations of crude oil in these two states. The government of President Olusegun Obasanjo also increased oil revenue allocation for the Niger Delta region from zero to 13% in addition to the normal statutory revenue allocations due to each state of the federation from the Nigerian federation accounts (Oluwaniyi, 2011).

On the 29<sup>th</sup> of May 2007, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua was inaugurated into office as the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Upon assumption of office, Yar'Adua moved in swiftly to address the crisis in the Niger Delta as one of his administration's seven-point agenda. President Yar'Adua first tinkered with an idea of holding a meeting with the stakeholders in

the region and also went on to schedule a Niger Delta Summit that failed to see the light of the day based on controversy. Still considering how to bring a lasting peace to the troubled region, President Yar'Adua created the Niger Delta Ministry with a mandate to focus on meeting the needs of the people of the region (Obi & Rustad, 2011). In furtherance of his determination to bring peace to the Niger Delta, President Yar'Adua took to the suggestions of the Niger Delta elders and inaugurated a 45-member Technical Committee on the Niger Delta on the 8<sup>th</sup> of September, 2008 (Obi & Rustad, 2011: Page 201). As a matter of fact, the crisis in the Niger Delta in the first nine months of the year 2008 had become embarrassing to President Yar'Adua and the situation was gradually becoming overwhelming to the Nigerian nation in many instances (Obi & Rustad, 2011: Page 201). Firstly, not less than 1,000 people resident in Niger Delta lost their lives during this period and about 300 people were taken hostage by the militants (Francis et al., 2011). In addition, the national government lost about \$23.7 billion in oil revenues during this period due to various illegal activities like oil bunkering and actions that could be classified as outright economic sabotage according to the report made public by the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (Francis et al., 2011). Consequent upon all these troubles and other negative economic effects, the Nigerian government was unable to meet up with its OPEC quota. The oil multinational companies operating in the region also lost revenues running into billions of dollars due to the conflicts. For instance, it is claimed that the oil multinational companies lost about \$21.5 billion US dollars between 2003 and 2007 due to this conflict and Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) particularly reported to have lost about \$10.6 billion (Obi & Rustad, 2011). In actual fact, the administration of President Yar'Adua saw the amnesty offer as a major drive in the management of oil-related conflicts in the Niger Delta. The administration believed that sustainable development in the Niger Delta region and Nigeria as a whole, can be achieved through peaceful initiatives as the amnesty offer

(Nwozor, 2010).

Therefore, upon its inauguration, the technical committee chaired by Ledun Mitee, the MOSOP President, was specifically mandated to gather, review previous reports on Niger Delta, assess the recommendations of the past reports and give other suggestions that will help the Nigerian National Government to achieve peace, sustainable development in the Niger Delta region as well as achieve human and environmental security for the troubled spot (Mitee, 2009).

According to Mitee (2009), the special Niger Delta technical committee's report was submitted to President Yar'Adua on December 1, 2008 with some of the following recommendations given

- The appointment of a mediator to act as a bridging gap, to facilitate discussions between the militants and the Federal Government of Nigeria
- Granting of amnesty to militants
- Launching a DDR campaign. That is, a disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation campaign to mop up arms and ammunition from the militants and reintegrate them into the society.
- Increase in the percentage of the oil revenue to the Niger Delta region from the current amount of 13 per cent to 25 per cent.
- Establishing rules and regulations that will compel oil companies to have insurance bonds
- Making it a national priority to enforce critical environmental laws in the region
- Ensuring that fraudulent environmental clean-ups of oil spills are revealed with the operators of such being prosecuted.
- Ensuring gas flaring was stopped by 31st December 2008 in line with the initial order by the Federal Government.



The government of President Umaru Yar'Adua yielded in part to the recommendations of the Technical Committee led by Ledun Mitee. Consequently, a Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament of Militants in the Niger Delta of Nigeria was inaugurated on the 5th of May, 2009. The amnesty panel was saddled with the responsibility of implementing the recommendation that concerns granting amnesty to the militants that have been causing unrest in the Niger Delta. The Amnesty Panel went to work and subsequently delivered a working paper on the amnesty programme. The Amnesty Panel recommended the terms, procedures and processes of granting an amnesty to the Niger Delta militants in its recommendation to the president. Relying on section 175 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, President Yar'Adua pronounced unconditional pardon to all individuals who engaged in activities that could be regarded as militant offences in the Niger Delta (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). The provisions of Section 175 allow the President after consultation with the Council of State to:

- "Grant any person concerned with or convicted of any offence created by an Act of the National Assembly a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions"
- "Grant to any person a respite, either for an indefinite or for a specified period, of the execution of any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence"
- "Substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence"
- "Remit the whole, or any part of any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence, or of any penalty, or forfeiture otherwise due to the State on account of such an offence" (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012).

The amnesty programme was officially launched on June 25, 2009 by President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua. According to the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, where amnesty was offered was planned to run for a period of 60 days (Mitee,

2009). The commencement date was fixed for August 6, 2009 and it was scheduled to run till October 4 of the same year. The effectiveness of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme was hinged on the preparedness and willingness of the armed groups in the troubled region to:

- Hand over all illegal arms in their possession
- Completely renounce all forms of armed struggle or militancy unconditionally
- Depose to an undertaking to cease from all forms of militancy.

While pronouncing an amnesty offer to the militants, the Nigerian President made reference to the fact that the challenges the Niger Delta region faces, is mainly a result of the failings of successive administrations to meet the demands of the people leading to the alarming level of restiveness being witnessed in the region (Mittee, 2009). Overall, the high incidence of the negative effects of the activities of the militants in the Niger Delta region led to the amnesty initiatives in the first place.

## **1.6 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME**

Keeping in line with the provisions of the amnesty offer, the Presidential Committee set up to administer amnesty programme in the Niger Delta pursued the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) of the Niger Delta militants through several approaches including the payment of monthly stipend to the ex-militants. As part of the initial plan, millions of dollars were paid on a scheduled basis to the leaders of the various armed groups in the crisis ridden oil-rich region for surrendering their weapons at the outset (Oluwaniyi, 2011). The DDRR strategy was followed by various programmes to rehabilitate and reintegrate the ex-militants back into mainstream national activities. Different rehabilitation centres across the six geopolitical zones of the Nigeria was set up for the ex-

militants to be able to conveniently attend various programmes including counselling and vocational trainings or different categories.

The key steps taken by the Presidential Amnesty Committee include the followings:

- The top leaders of each of the militant groups were invited and lodged in expensive suites in Hilton Hotel Abuja for several weeks at a go and they were made to engage top representatives of the government on how to end militancy in the Niger Delta.
- Different but unique educational and vocational classes were organized for the ex-militants abroad, in countries such as Houston in the United States, London, United Kingdom, Seoul, and South Africa (Mitee, 2009).

In 2011, the Nigeria National Petroleum Company (NNPC), which is the nation's main oil company, commenced the payments of varying amounts of money in US dollars to the top leaders of the militant groups in the Niger Delta for onward payments of stipends to their ex-foot soldiers to protect the oil pipelines that were their targets in the past (Oluwaniyi, 2011). An agreement was signed with the leader of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), Mujahid Asari-Dokubo who claimed to have 4,000 ex-militants in his group and he was paid the sum of \$9 million a year for onward payments to his ex-foot soldiers to guard the pipelines which they used to vandalise (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). Likewise, the NNPC also signed a contract with Government 'Tompolo' Ekpemupolo for the sum of \$22.9 million per year to protect oil pipelines which they have always targeted. Others who benefitted from this contract-for-pipeline protection are Generals Ebikabowei 'Boyloaf' Victor Ben and Ateke Tom ( Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). The two Niger Delta "warlords" were each given the sum of \$3.8 million US dollars for onward payment to their ex-foot soldiers to protect pipelines they have often blown off before (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012).

Overall, about 26,358 ex-combatants accepted the amnesty offer and were camped in six states in the Niger Delta and a monthly stipend paid to each individual throughout the period of their stay in the camp (Oluwaniyi, 2011). A number of researchers that have studied the impact of the amnesty programme on Niger Delta Oluduro & Oluduro (2012), Igini (2011), and Oluwaniyi (2011) all agreed that the amnesty offer has greatly reduced the violent situations that once characterised the entire length and breadth of the Niger Delta. The amnesty programme appeared to have led to a decline in the incidence of crisis and the influx/accumulation of arms and ammunition by combatants that once engaged the agents of Nigerian government in arms struggle for decades. In most cases, the militants complied with the terms of the amnesty offer. The economy of the Nigerian nation has also received a boost since the amnesty programme took effect. However, despite this relative peace being experienced in the Niger Delta currently, many analysts and researchers have raised concern over the feasibility that the amnesty offer would lead to a genuine and lasting peace in the Niger Delta on the long run and subsequently, the economy of the Nigerian nation. The arguments being adduced for this scepticism include the fact that the current amnesty policy is not focused on human rights which has been the root cause of the crisis in the Niger Delta region for decades (Unabia, 2011).

### **1.7. THE KEY RESEARCH QUESTION**

The lack of research on this topic led this researcher to consider the following research question:

*Could the amnesty programme be rationally taken as adequate in bringing lasting peace to this troubled oil-rich region of Nigeria?*

### **1.8. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY**

This study aims at adding to the body of research work on the Niger Delta by investigating the perceptions of the people of the Niger Delta of Nigeria about the amnesty programme and its ability to secure a lasting peace for the oil-rich region of Nigeria.

### **1.9. The Limitations of the Study**

It is very important to indicate that not many conclusive research studies have been done in the field of the potential challenges that could derail the post-amnesty peace-building process in the oil-rich region of the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Though there were a number of articles on the possible challenges that might arise post-amnesty but none considered these challenges in the light of the empirical evidence or analysis that could lend weight to the possible challenges which this study is focused on. Therefore, the weight of any previous research study could not be evaluated in order to guide this study.

As a result of the above observed limitations, some theories applied in this study may be less suitable than expected but this should not be taken as the fact until a more decisive study have been carried out.

A way of making up for this limitation, is through the use of case study analysis and primary data collection through the use of survey that will be discussed in detail.

## 2.0 CHAPTER TWO

### **REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE ON THE CHALLENGES OF POST-AMNESTY PEACEBUILDING PROCESS IN THE NIGER DELTA OF NIGERIA'S SOUTH-SOUTH REGION**

This chapter seeks to explore the literature on the subject of peace-building and the possible challenges that could arise from the post-amnesty package offered in May 2009 by the Federal Government of Nigeria to the militants in the Niger Delta. The aim of this chapter here is to assess the relevance of multiple literatures to the research aims and objectives of this study. In addition, the goal is to identify imminent dangers that could shatter the relative peace being witnessed in the Niger Delta in the last four years and also demonstrate the relevance of these literatures to this research work .

The previous chapter of this research study has examined the background leading to the protracted social conflict witnessed in the Niger Delta of Nigeria for decades and the inability of successive Federal Governments of Nigeria to address the perceived root cause of the crisis. The amnesty policy was the initiative of the administration of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua who was president from May 29, 2007 till May 5, 2010 when he died suddenly from a protracted illness diagnosed to be pericarditis.

The essential features of the amnesty policy were aimed at militants who were expected to embrace peace by laying down their arms in return for pardon, offer of money, state-sponsored skill acquisition programmes and reintegration into the Nigerian society (Oluwaniyi, 2011).

While the amnesty initiative could be considered laudable because it brought relative peace to the Niger Delta region for the first time in decades, it is still arguable whether the amnesty programme is sufficient to bring lasting peace to the entire region because the root cause of the crisis in the first instance surrounds the demands for "improved human capabilities" as noted

by many researchers including Unabia (2011: Page 33). The three main emphasis of the Presidential Implementation Committee (PIC) of the amnesty policy were on disarmament, rehabilitation, and reintegration of the ex-combatants into the normal society of the Nigerian state. Unfortunately, while all the focus of the PIC was on the people who took up arms to fight the Nigerian state as a way to push for resource control, the emphasis seems misplaced because the attempt were not focused on addressing capabilities failures that led to the crisis in the first instance.

## **2.1. LITERATURE ON CAPABILITIES FAILURES**

In order to analyse the effectiveness of the amnesty programme in bringing sustainable peace, it would be useful to look at theories that would help understand the nature and root causes of these protracted conflicts in the Niger Delta region.

According to Martha Nussbaum's Capability Approach, the concept of capabilities failures stems from the universal perceptions people have about themselves not being able to live a life 'one has reason to value. Capability approach is a philosophical approach that is rooted in the universality of human flourishing and dignity (Unabia, 2011: Page 7). The theory of human capabilities is built on the premise that human beings are entitled to live a good quality life and to fulfil this, there need to be a set of basic human capabilities which are essential to live a good human life. Some of these capabilities include being in good health, adequate shelter, being able to live a good life (Burchadt & Hick, 2016).

This approach has significantly contributed to the concept of human development for the United Nations Human Development Index and UNDP to use a measure of quality of life based on human capability. Providing a framework to compare levels of education, health and standard of living across countries (Burchadt & Hick, 2016).

Human capabilities are not tangible goods but a feeling of urgent human entitlements based on the quest of individuals for justice (Nussbaum, 2008: Page 285-290). It is the duty of government to make sure that the quest of individuals for basic entitlements are protected and realized. Where the state fails to guarantee the basic rights, the like of the violent scenarios witnessed in the Niger Delta of Nigeria for decades are inevitable.

One of the earliest agitations of the Niger Delta people was led by Isaac Boro in 1966. In his revolt against the Nigerian state Boro declared a Republic of Niger Delta and charged his followers with the following thought provoking words:

*“Remember your petroleum which is being pumped out daily from your veins and fight for your freedom”* (Watts, 2008: Page 37).

Though the revolt was crushed with force by the Nigerian government but Isaac Boro had voiced a major concern, which was in line with the concept of capabilities failures stated above. Not addressing such concern as strictly as it should be would probably not bring a lasting peace, which the proponents of amnesty policy seemed to have aimed at in the amnesty policy statements (Watts, 2008).

Several notable events in the Niger Delta over many decade points to the demand for a new social formula with the Nigerian state and the oil multinational companies that have operated in the region at one time or the other. Examples of such events include The Willink Commission (1957-58), the Declaration of the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR), and the Kaiama Declaration (Ibeanu & Luckham, 2006: Page 38). The OBR was drafted by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) to push for better-quality socio-economic conditions and resource control.



The Ogoni Bill of Rights written by the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) captures the elements of Nussbaum's capabilities theory graphically as it relates to them in the following statements:

- "That the search for oil has caused severe land and food shortages in Ogoni land which has been one of the most densely populated areas of Africa..."
- "That neglectful environmental pollution laws and substandard inspection techniques of the Federal authorities have led to the complete degradation of the Ogoni environment, turning our homeland into an ecological disaster".
- "That the Ogoni people lack education, health and other social facilities..."
- "That it is intolerable that one of the richest areas of Nigeria should wallow in abject poverty and destitution... "
- "That the Ogoni people wish to manage their own affairs." (Ogoni Bill of Rights, 1990: Page 5).

The statements reflected in the Ogoni Bill of Rights points to the fact that the struggle in the Niger Delta was consequently because of the people lacking capabilities to live the life they would consider as meaningful in the light of the abundance of natural resources available in their region. The social movements that arose in the Niger Delta region started out as non-violent, justice seeking movements which unfortunately degenerated into armed struggle, violent attacks and confrontation with the agents of the Nigerian government as well as the vandalism of oil pipelines and facilities in their attempt to press home their demands for basic amenities. It is, therefore, obvious that capabilities failure is at the root of the long-standing Niger Delta crisis and solving the problem holistically would be an effective way of ensuring sustainable peace but doing otherwise cannot guarantee peace.

In actual fact, several researchers have documented many activities of multinational oil companies that endanger the Niger Delta environment leaving behind serious negative impacts

on the people and their means of livelihood. For example, gas flaring, oil spillage, and forest encroachment are major activities of oil companies that degrade the environment and causes deplorable health effects for the people of the region. Gas flaring has been a problem in the Niger Delta for more than fifty years and it appears nothing is being done currently to address this practice. Gas flaring is an unethical practice of burning natural gas commonly associated with the exploration of crude oil when it is pumped from oil wells just because there have been no sufficient infrastructures to make use of the associated natural gas. (Francis et al., 2011).

Though Nigeria is regarded as one of the highest gas flaring nations in the world with the attendant effects of a huge greenhouse emission more than what is obtainable in the entire sub-Saharan Africa (Unabia, 2011: Page 12), it is rather unfortunate that ecological rehabilitation of the Niger Delta is not included in the amnesty package. Also the Niger Delta Ministry which should be at the forefront of the target to develop the entire oil rich region as claimed by the Nigerian government is riddled with corruption and ineptitude meaning that the tendency for the aggrieved inhabitants of the Niger Delta region to revert back to arm struggle and large-scale conflict in the next few years hangs in the air (Ushle, 2013: Page 40).

Applying the Capability approach, there is a clear failure of the Nigeria State in ensuring these 'capabilities' are enjoyed by its citizens. Ensuring policy is made to safeguard these capabilities is a starting point, as these are the basic needs every human is entitled to. Where there is a capability failure, grievances arises and issues as greed arises which makes a society susceptible to conflicts. In these instance conflict arising from the struggle to receive the fair share of the wealth gained from oil production in the Niger Delta.

## **2.2. LITERATURE ON GREED, GRIEVANCE AND OPPORTUNITY THEORY FOR RESOURCE-RICH COUNTRIES**

Gow, Olonisakin, & Dijxhoorn (2013) suggests that for most individuals who take part in militancy or collective violence, they do so without any link to having suffered from psychopathic disorders (Gow, Olonisakin, & Dijxhoorn, 2013: Page 268). If this finding is true, it implies that most individuals who participate in militancy do so for some other reasons which might be political or strategic purposes. Studies on natural resources and violence framework suggests that resource-rich countries especially the developing countries produces considerably greater risks of grievances consequent on some conditions like when the resource-endowed bears a greater portion of the costs of extraction and when there is a general assumption that the government at the centre is getting a good chunk of the resource-wealth at the expense of the resource-endowed (Takon, 2011). Collier and Hoeffler have empirically confirmed that resource-rich countries have a greater propensity for conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Greed and grievance have been identified as the two motivating factors that sparks the fire for conflict and rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002) but the authors found little empirical evidence to support grievances being a factor that causes conflict. Interestingly, Collier and Hoeffler also found that neither inequality nor political oppression has the tendency to increase the risk of triggering conflict but they discovered that a society with ethnic dominance has a tendency of drifting towards conflict. (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002), describes ethnic dominance as situation where one ethnic group overshadows other groups by about 45-90 percent of the inhabitants.

Therefore, when considering the analysis of resource-rich countries and the level of risks towards conflict, there is the school of thought that may be described as the 'economistic rational-choice narratives' as used by Takon (2011: Page 48) and there is another school of thought that deploys grievance-based paradigm. While the first school of thought underscore greed as the motivating factor behind conflict in a resource-rich nation, the other promotes state repression and economic deprivation as the determinants for conflict.

Though it is subject to rational argument but there are evidences both anecdotal and conjectural that shows that conflicts in the Niger Delta of Nigeria are connected to the growing tendency to benefit from oil bunkering or oil theft. Therefore, when considered contextually, the motives for violence are connected to the availability of oil resources and the motives are perhaps dominated by greed and grievance (Takon, 2011: Page 48).

While taking an analytical look at the greed-grievance concepts as proposed by Collier & Hoeffler and Berdal & Malone, Takon observes that these research studies sheds more light to the argument that natural resources could serve as a motive for violence. While Berdal & Malone claim that where a resource-rich people recognises that it has been deprived of a significant part of the benefit derivable from the naturally occurring resources in its domain, the tendency to resort to violence or ignite a conflict becomes a norm (Berdal & Malone, 2000). On the other hand, Collier & Hoeffler who propounded the greed-grievance theory, argues that the crave for profit, the desire to be in charge of the natural resources in their domain and ill-conceived ambitions motivate both the greed of the main actors in conflict whether state or non-state leaders in the societies where abundant natural resources exists. While the situations in the oil-rich Cabinda region in Angola, Niger Delta in Nigeria or Katanga, Congo where naturally occurring copper could be found in abundance serves as examples that illustrates the Berdal & Malone theory while the armed struggle and conflict that once ravaged the sub-Saharan Africa nations like Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Niger Delta region could be cited as examples of the Collier & Hoeffler theory (Tajoon, 2011: Page 49).

Another angle to the argument on greed-grievance theory is the result of the research by Michael Ross. The empirical analysis conducted by Michael Ross on conflicts in oil-rich and diamond-rich regions especially where payment of rent is applicable. Ross observes that naturally occurring oil, diamond and timber are plundered differently just because these resources have specific characteristics that make them more susceptible to looting. For

example, diamond is portable and, therefore, it is easy to smuggle. Oil resources in the onshore basin can easily be tapped unnoticed by oil thieves through bunkering as it is often reported in the Niger Delta of Nigeria (Ross, 2003).

Looking at the two arguments, Takon says the greed-grievance theory is reasonable, however, it has been established that it is limited in its pure form when viewed from the perspective of case analysis and in the context of conflict triggered by oil resources as the scenario in Nigeria indicates. In the first instance, Takon considers the assumptions on which the greed-grievance arguments were based to be rather weak. It could be argued that the several years and resources spent on strategies meant to develop the Niger Delta and make the area habitable have not yielded any positive results. Therefore, it could be argued that the efforts of the government at developing the Niger Delta region were not directed appropriately and, hence, could not abate the raging conflicts in the region (Takon, 2011).

In the second instance, Takon claims it is difficult to separate the motives involved in the greed-grievance model because the motives behind one often overlap with the motives behind the other and in some instances, the motives could even be fluid during conflict. A good example is the relationship that exists between criminally minded militant groups and the community that host them which illustrates the place of motives in the greed and grievance models of analysing conflict. In the third instance, Takon argued that the greed-grievance model fails to adequately provide the basis for understanding the role of political and social forces or other variables like the role of Ijaw politics in the Niger Delta oil-related conflicts (Takon, 2011: Page 50).

Arguably, the greed- grievance model alone is not a sufficient theoretical explanation as to why protracted social conflicts occur, it is useful but other theories that highlight other factors need to be taken into account. This is why this research project looks at various theoretical

frameworks to explain conflict in a bid to understand why there have been conflicts in the Niger Delta region.

In addition, Takon rejects the resource curse proposition and affirmed that several forces were responsible for the oil-related Niger Delta conflicts. Perhaps ethnicity plays some roles in the Niger Delta debacle (Takon. 2011: Page 52). The next theory will look at ethnicity and the role it plays in the Niger Delta.

### **2.3. LITERATURE ON ETHNICITY, ETHNIC POLITICS, AND ETHNIC GROUP THEORY IN CONFLICT**

This section mainly concerns the role of the Ijaw ethnic group in the Niger Delta conflicts. The Ijaw ethnic group is the largest of the various ethnic groups that have been involved in the conflicts in the oil-rich Niger-Delta region of Nigeria. This ethnic group occupies a position of significant interest in the study of ethnicity, ethnic politics and ethnic group theory in conflict management specifically as it relates to the protracted conflicts in the Niger Delta. It is important to understand at the outset that group politics phenomena in Africa is markedly distinct from its notion in western societies. In Africa, ethnic politics focuses on protection of the rights of members within the state (Kalejaiye & Alliyu , 2013). Ethnic groups literarily function as pressure groups. Each of the theories on ethnicity, that is, primordialism, constructivism and instrumentalism has a bearing on the phenomenon of the Ijaw ethnic group activities as a major plot in the protracted resource related conflicts in the Niger Delta region of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Kalejaiye & Alliyu, 2013).

In the Western societies, considerable effort and progress has been made in the direction of curbing some if not most of the negative consequences that emanate from the concepts of ethnicity as racial and/or interest group affiliation through the use of legislation. In Africa, and

particularly in Nigeria a similar effort or level of progress has not been made. In addition, in Africa, the single most important determinant of ethnicity has been the common language (Kalejaiye & Alliyu, 2013).

As a concept, primordialism is applicable to the Ijaw as a distinct ethnic group as it is evident that they share a common language (though with several dialects), a common culture and similar physical attributes such as skin complexion and physical stature (Takon, 2011: Page 56).

So also it can be argued that the various sub-groups or ethnic groups in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria have over a period of time been lumped into one group termed the Niger Delta peoples even though they have different languages and somewhat different customs and traditions. This evident construction of a macro ethnic grouping of the Niger Delta peoples can be discerned in the classification of that region as the South-south region of Nigeria and the creation of socio-economic institutions such as The Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC). Also the various peoples of the Niger Delta have over the years tended to down play their group distinctiveness and have developed somewhat similar customs and traditions such as dressing. This obviously is a manifestation of social construction of ethnic group identity which confirms the postulations of the constructivist school (Takon, 2011: Page 60).

The most obvious correlation of ethnic group theory is in the area of instrumentalism. This is very clear from the fact that the various groups in the Niger Delta have forged a united front to fight against what they perceive as economic exploitation and suppression of the rights of the people of the Niger Delta. Most of the militant groups with the exception, possibly of MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People) are regarded as either Ijaw militant groups or Ijaw dominated militant groups (Francis et al., 2011).

It is arguable that the violence in the Niger Delta is fuelled by perceived inequalities in socio-politico-economic balance of the Nigerian state (Obi, 2009). It is also perceived by the people of the Niger Delta that they are being short changed in the political and economic equilibrium of the Nigerian state because political power essentially is wielded by the Hausa-Fulani group of the core North in conjunction with the Yoruba people of the western region to the detriment of the people of the Niger Delta (Francis et al., 2011; Takon, 2011). There is some justification to this view as it is on record that prior to the ascension to power of Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (a Niger Deltan of the Ijaw ethnic group extraction) in 2011, political power in Nigeria had been jointly held by the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba for a total of 47 years out of the 51 years of Nigeria's independence (about 92% of the time) (Obi and Rustad, 2011). It is also clear that crude oil which is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy is derived from the Niger Delta yet the region lags behind other parts of the country in infrastructural, industrial and economic development (Obi, 2009). This view is further reinforced by the fact that most of the privately owned oil blocks in the region are allegedly owned by non-indigenes of the region, mostly members of the political class which invariably are the Hausa-Fulani. Weighing this allegation with the fact that the region has experienced extreme environmental degradation without any evidence of the exercise of political will to address this issue and compel the erring multinational oil companies to conform to standard practices worldwide implies that the ingredients for violent opposition and protracted conflicts is surely in place (Obi, 2009: Page 108). The peoples of the Niger Delta have in the past expectedly forged a common front in order to fight against this perceived injustice and threat to their survival and it is doubtful if the amnesty program as implemented by the federal government of Nigeria can ensure a lasting peace in the Niger Delta region (Obi, 2009).

Edward Azar's theory of Protracted Social Conflict, ties in concepts from the various theories just mentioned above. In relation to human capabilities theory, Azar argued that there are basic



needs individuals are entitled to (shelter, life, food) just as the capabilities approach stipulates and it is the government's primary responsibility to provide these basic needs (Azar, 1990: Page 10–12). He argued that grievances result from deprivation of basic human needs and are usually expressed collectively. Where there is state failure to address these grievances, it 'cultivates a niche for protracted social conflict' (Azar, 1990: Page 9). This is the case in the Niger Delta region as groups both violent and non-violent formed on a collective interest on marginalisation and deprivation. In terms of ethnicity, Azar believed that protracted social conflict has a high tendency to occur in regions where high levels of political and economic underdevelopment with multi ethnic groups is present. The likelihood of conflict will be determined by the relationship between the government and the identity group (ethnic, cultural). The Niger Delta region has the highest number of ethnic groups in Nigeria which feel marginalised. An example is the Ijaw ethnic group which has been very vocal and active in the fight for a fair share of oil wealth and development (Obi, 2009; Francis et al., 2011).

#### **2.4. A REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME AND ITS IMPLEMENTATIONS**

While undertaking a review of the amnesty programme to understand if it satisfies the objective of empowering the oil producing communities of the Niger Delta even if on an incremental basis, Igini (2011) observed that the lack of the underlying fundamental issues such as resource control and the establishment of true federalism seems to cast a shadow on the future of the amnesty policy of the Nigerian government. Igini (2011: Page 5) argues that the present efforts of government were at best directed towards treating the symptoms of the crisis and not the root cause.

Specifically, Igini identified some weaknesses and challenges of the amnesty offer from his perspective and the following observations were the most striking:

- Inability of the amnesty policy to offer compensation to the people of Gbaramatu Kingdom, (Delta) for the destruction of their homes and or for being displaced from their homes.
- The amnesty policy appears to have been symptomatically approached rather than holistically. Igini explains this view point to mean that the key issues such as communal beneficence, indigenous participation and resource control which necessitated the symptoms were not addressed by the amnesty policy (Igini, 2011: Page 3).

Igini's assertion that the Amnesty Programme was approached symptomatically is right in the fact that it did not address the underlying causes as indicated in the theoretical explanations which was addressed. The need to provide human capabilities, prevent minority ethnic groups from feeling marginalised thereby tackling the issue of grievances. Also the need to share oil wealth fairly and gaining environmental stability. All these are issues that the federal government overlooked, instead, the government tackled the results of these deep rooted causes as a measure of bringing peace which may arguably be temporary.

In addition, Igini (2011: Page 4) suggested that an approach similar to the recent models in some other oil producing countries such as Chad, Kuwait, the UAE, and Norway could help Nigeria bring peace that would last the test of time to the Niger Delta. Igini averred that such steps would have been sufficient to guarantee peace on the long run if conceived and implemented. Efforts were made in these countries to utilize revenues from oil and gas for the welfare of the entire citizenry, including the present and generations yet unborn. In concluding, Igini, a lawyer and a renowned Nigerian activist who undertook the research work with the support of a Think Tank Initiative Programme initiated and run by the International Research and Development Centre (IDRC) feared that the amnesty policy may just go the way of the previous attempts to address the Niger Delta crisis without any meaningful effects that could endure the test of time (Igini, 201).

Oluduro & Oluduro (2012) also studied the challenges and the prospects of the amnesty offer of the federal government of Nigeria for the Niger Delta militants. Both researchers observed that one of the main limitations faced with the amnesty programme was the area of poor implementation. Oluduro & Oluduro (2012: Page 52) observed that the amnesty offer was not implemented in line with the recommendations contained in the report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee set up earlier to draw up a plan for the amnesty programme. One of the major flaws of the implementation was the inability to engage the ex-combatants in a formal peace agreement or open negotiations. Instead, a top-down non-inclusive approach was adopted where negotiations were held with the Niger Delta elders and or elites and the commanders of the ex-combatants (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012: Page 53). The commanders were more interested in how much money they could make from the process rather than the benefits that could accrue to the people of Niger Delta as a whole (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). This singular step was a major setback to the amnesty programme. Another important factor was the very significant differences between the payments made to the ex-combatants and their commanders (Oluwaniyi, 2011; Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012: Page 52).

In addition, the prevailing limited employment opportunities in the Nigerian nation for the ex-militants that have handed in their arms and ammunitions is a great danger to the sustainability of the relative peace witnessed in the region at the commencement of the amnesty offer. Looking at all inadequacies inherent in the implementation of the amnesty programme, Oluduro & Oluduro (2012) concluded that it appears that the Nigerian government failed to learn from the implementation of the previous failed programmes meant to bring peace to the Niger Delta. In actual fact, the Nigerian state has implemented several programmes since the effects of oil exploration in the Niger Delta began to generate revolt from the people of the region but none of those programmes actually succeeded in bringing any lasting peace to the region. Oluduro & Oluduro (2012) stated that the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB)

was inaugurated but it failed to make any meaningful impact on the life of the people in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Likewise, the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) was set up to bring succour to the region but it also failed because the top-down approach was used in each of case rather than focusing on the entire people of the region. The Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) was also set up but it also failed in like manner (Oluduro & Oluduro; 2012).

According to Oluduro & Oluduro (2012: Page 6), it appears that the militants were also not sincere in the amount of arms and ammunitions handed in by them to the authority in fulfilment of their own bargain of the disarmament process. Whereas there were 26,358n ex-combatants registered for the amnesty offer, the number of arms and ammunitions surrendered were short of expectation. The amnesty committee recorded 1,798 rifles, 70 RPGs, 1,981 guns, one spear and six cannons, and 159 pistols in all from the over twenty thousand ex-militants who had at various times in several years turned the Niger Delta into a war zone (Oluduro & Oluduro; 2012). The inference made by Oluduro & Oluduro (2012) was that the region was still being stock piled with weapons and ammunitions yet undeclared.

Here are some other pertinent concerns raised by Oluduro & Oluduro (2012) about the failure to implement the amnesty recommendations to terms:

- The amnesty programme targets the ex-combatants without regards to the victims of militancy in the Niger Delta.
- Several women, mothers and their children that were displaced by the raging crisis were completely excluded from the amnesty offer perhaps because the government thought they had no means to cause violence in the region.
- Grassroots organizations were also not included in the amnesty offer

- Other deprived and aggrieved people in the Niger Delta were also not captured in the amnesty programme.

These people excluded are arguably just as important as the parties included in the amnesty programme. They are also stakeholders whose human capabilities are overlooked and can cause built up grievances which can have an adverse effect for peace in the region in the long run.

As indicated by Oluduro & Oluduro (2012) in their work which looked at the flaws in the implementation of the amnesty policy to usher in peace in the Niger Delta, it is apparent that the frustrations and the sense of the entire people of the Niger Delta region could not have been appeased with the amnesty programme so far implemented. What this may imply consequentially is that other people who have been excluded in the juicy amnesty offer could catch a wrong signal from the flawed implementation and subsequently take up weapons against the Nigerian state if only to seek recognition from the authority.

Oluduro & Oluduro (2012) suggested that the amnesty programme ought to have been all-inclusive in line with the recommendations of the Niger Delta Technical Committee inaugurated to draft the amnesty policy. In addition, Oluduro & Oluduro (2012) suggested that the amnesty offer should be complemented with the relevant socio-economic development of the entire Niger Delta region. It was argued that this measure will prevent new and more daring elements from emerging from the creeks of the Niger Delta to wage war against the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies operating in the region.

In reviewing the implementation of the amnesty programme, Unabia (2011) used the Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach to determine whether the processes involved with the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of the ex-

combatants were tailored towards improving the human capabilities of the people of Niger Delta of Nigeria or not.

Unabia (2011) argued that a major source of the crisis in the Niger Delta is the lack of human capabilities, which is very essential for an individual to live a life that is decent and dignified. Looking at the entire scenario of the Niger Delta region, human capabilities is arguably lacking. The basic necessities of life like food, shelter, education, security, and gainful employment among other essential things of life are non-existent in a region where the crude oil pumped from its ground has been the mainstay of the economy of the entire country for decades.

In critically analysing the implementation of the amnesty programme, Unabia (2011) observed that there was the element of doubt that the amnesty policy could address the problem of capabilities failure as it was being implemented by the Nigerian government. It was Unabia's believe that the amnesty offer was only introduced as a measure to stop the violence that has considerably cut short the oil production capacity of the nation to less than half of its original capacity rather than introduce a policy that will guarantee long-lasting peace in the Niger Delta.

Oluwaniyi's approach to the review of the implementation of the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta region was a bit different from the previous researchers already reviewed in this study. This researcher critically assesses the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme of the Nigerian government for the ex-combatants within the context of peace building via the amnesty offer in an unstable and crisis-ridden oil rich Niger Delta. Oluwaniyi (2011b) also considers the effect of the amnesty programme for peace in the oil rich region, interview sections were held with some ex-combatants in their camps and suggestions were made.

It is abysmal to know through this research work that the crucial parts of the amnesty programme and the DDDR process of the amnesty policy were not complied with. Oluwaniyi

argued that the amnesty programme was launched without any road map. According to Oluwaniyi (2011b), the federal government probably thought that the armed militias were the only obstacle to the nation's petrol-business so that getting them to surrender their arms and weapons and providing them with monetary rewards will assuage them and restore stability to the Niger Delta region and also the Nigeria economy which is heavily reliant on oil revenues from the region.

The prerequisites for the sustainability of the amnesty programme anchors on the peace agreement which was to be duly signed by all the parties involved with the amnesty offer and also in the presence of international non-state actors as observers but none of the procedures was followed. Oluwaniyi (2011) affirmed that the amnesty proclamation was a just a mere "thought of" idea so that the government had to hurriedly declare it to avert a worst scenario after the oil production and export processes had already be hampered due to the use of force by the previous successive governments. Overall, Oluwaniyi (2011b) argued that the amnesty programme was poorly implemented, indeed has been a recurring observation in most of the post-amnesty studies reviewed in this research work. In line with Oludoro & Oludoro's argument, it can be argued from the review of researchers so far that the poor implementation of the programme clearly shows that the process of the implementation negates the essence of the amnesty programme.

So, how do we expect the amnesty offer to bring a level of enduring peace to the Niger Delta? A good example cited by Oluwaniyi (2011b) to support the claim of poor implementation of the policy was the setting up of Presidential Committee on Amnesty and Disarmament of Militants to oversee the amnesty process after the announcement of the amnesty and its acceptance by militants rather than before it. Unfortunately, it became clear that the burden of implementing the amnesty offer was too cumbersome on a committee. Subsequently, the

original committee was dissolved and five new committees were formed to carry on with the process (Oluwaniy, 2011b).

Iro Aghedo (2012) offers a rich dimension to the appraisal of the amnesty programme as implemented by the Nigerian government for the Niger Delta militants. This study used secondary data as its main sources of authority and, hence, extrapolates the perceived imperfections in the implementations of the amnesty programme and the irregularities observed in the implementation of the DDR programme. Aghedo (2012) observed that the amnesty granted to the militants was successful in a way as it had abruptly brought to an end the age-long physical combat for which the oil-rich region of the Niger Delta has always been known for world-wide for decades. However, Aghedo (2012) was quick to point out that the current prevailing situations in the Niger Delta could best be described as a ‘‘no war, no peace’’ scenario simply because though no war is currently raging in the region but peace is rather elusive as at the moment.

While noting that the amnesty programme offers some rays of hope that peace may eventually reign in the creeks of the Niger Delta, Aghedo (2012) expressed fear about the ability of the amnesty programme, as it has been implemented till date, to usher in the much needed processes for sustainable peace-building. This researcher argues that sustainable peace cannot be achieved in the Niger Delta until painstaking efforts are made to identify and tame the incentives that lures youth in the region to embrace militancy and violence. Aghedo (2012) identifies some of these incentives for militancy and violence to include environmental degradation, lack of fairness in sharing oil rents, incidences of human rights violation and extra-judicial killings.

Aghedo (2012) claims that efforts at peace-building in the Niger Delta have never been lacking either at the state level or federal level but poor strategies for the implementation of peace



restoration ideas have been the main problem leading to a breakdown in talks in each instance and, hence, leading to an escalation of conflict. Aghedo (2012) cited some reasons why pockets of violence still ravage the Niger Delta in this amnesty era to include the following:

- The militants who deserted amnesty and several of them who embraced amnesty claimed that the entire amnesty offer came out of the blue. They claimed that prior consultation with militants who are the supposed beneficiaries of the amnesty package was not done. In addition, prior consultation with the host communities designated as camps for the ex-militants as part of the exercise for the reintegration of the ex-warlords and their foot soldiers was neglected by the Federal Government. The consequence was that the amnesty programme and the attendant DDR process kicked off without the ex-militants seeing themselves as part and parcel of the amnesty programme but rather that the programme was forced on them. Also, the amnesty package was launched without adequate data on such important factors such as the number of people involved with the insurgence, their education and skill acquisition needs as well as the number of accommodation spaces to be provided in each of the rehabilitation centres leading to avoidable inconveniences and inadequate accommodations for the ex-fighters. Some ex-militants staged protests to express displeasure about the poor implementation of the amnesty programme.
- Corruption and abuse of office by some of those saddled with the responsibility of administering amnesty package.
- Non-inclusion of vulnerable persons in the amnesty programme. Persons like those who suffered damage and trauma, women and non-militant young people who lost loved ones like husbands and fathers in the conflict are prone to embracing violence at the slightest opportunity.

- The entire Niger Delta is still littered with small arms and light weapons though federal authorities claimed thorough mopping of arms have been carried out. Unfortunately, a lot of these arms and light weapons are in the wrong hands like political thugs, ex-militants, new breed of insurgents, street urchins and armed robbers making sustainable peace-building rather elusive (Aghedo, 2012).

The research work by Ikoh and Ukpong (2013) used primary data obtained directly from the Niger Delta. The primary aim of this study was to determine the factors that were responsible for the renewed violence being witnessed in the region post-amnesty with the goal of providing recommendations that will help the region experience sustainable peace.

Ikoh & Ukpong (2013) claimed that the amnesty package implemented by the Nigerian government as demonstrated with the way its DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) programmes were designed to achieve military and security objectives only rather than the sustainable peace of the entire Niger Delta region.

One of the important points made in Ikoh & Ukpong (2013) was that the implementers of the amnesty programme advertently or inadvertently neglected to include some historical factors such as the missions of the different militant groups. It is no longer news that some militant groups were formed and operated on objectives that were not only less than the mutual benefits of the Niger Delta region but also criminal in nature like those who have been exploiting the conflict to build wealth for themselves through piracy, oil bunkering and kidnapping for monetary ransom.

By using a questionnaire structure that elicit responses from a broad sample of the ex-militants comprising of 293 persons, data was collected on parameters such as their socio-demographic information, their perceptions about amnesty – whether they regarded it as worthwhile or not

and whether they nurse any fear about the amnesty programme (Ikoh & Ukpong, 2013: Page 146).

Questions that elicit responses about the main factors that makes militancy attractive and the conceptions of the ex-militants who embraced amnesty about their counterparts who deserted amnesty were also included.

Ikoh & Ukpong (2013) surprisingly obtained a high mean rating of these data showing that the ex-militants were satisfied with the amnesty package offered to them but the respondents also widely expressed their fear about the ability of the amnesty programme to achieve a comprehensive success due to their perceptions that the implementation of the programme was rather faulty.

In addition, the findings from Ikoh & Ukpong's (2013) research work shows that the ex-militants did not believe that the amnesty offer alone is sufficient to translate to or bring about the complete development of the Niger Delta region.

The recommendations Ikoh & Ukpong (2013: Page 157) based on the findings of their research work include the followings:

- A supervised programme of financial empowerments for all products of the amnesty skill acquisition trainings.
- Outright employment for the ex-militants or the provision of adequate trainings for setting up small-scale businesses.
- Complete mopping up of arms from the nooks and crannies of the creeks in the Niger Delta region.
- Deliberate efforts to bring back amnesty deserters and reintegrate them via the involvement of militant leaders.

- Extension of the skill acquisition trainings of the amnesty package to non-militant youths to serve as empowerment benefits for human capital development of the Niger Delta.

Overall, the findings of Ikoh & Ukpong (2013) research work on the amnesty package were consistent with the findings of Oluwaniyi (2011b) and Oluduro & Oluduro (2012) but in contrast, its analysis provide a deeper understanding of the realities that provided the platform for the insurgency in the Niger Delta in the first instance. From the foregoing, it is important to take a look at relevant literature on arms proliferation in the oil-rich Niger Delta.

## **2.5. CRITICAL REVIEWS OF SOME RELEVANT LITERATURES ON THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN THE NIGER DELTA OF NIGERIA**

Small arms and light weapons are the readily available and easy to use tools, which constitute the primary tool of violence and fuel conflicts in every part of the world. Oluwaniyi (2011b) identifies the militant groups operating in the Niger Delta as being mostly responsible for the spread of light weapons and small arms in the region. Laurence (1998: Page 11) defines small arms and light weapons in line with the definition of the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms as conventional weapons that do not lead to mass destruction but are different from major conventional weapons with the characteristics like being of smaller size, usually not too expensive to procure, usually weigh less, more portable, less visible –can be concealed in small bags, they requires little or no maintenance since these weapons are usually rugged, and they can be put to use for several years. Laurence’s (1998) categorisation of small arms and light weapons include the following:

Small arms as weapons that include: Revolvers and self-loading pistols, assault rifles, rifles and carbines, light machine guns and submachine guns (Laurence, 1998: Page 12).

On the other hand, light weapons include: heavy machine guns, portable anti-aircraft guns, handheld under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable launchers of antitank missile and rocket systems, portable antitank guns, and recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of calibers up to less than 100-mm inclusive (Laurence, 1998: Page 12).

Under the small arms and light weapons category, the ammunition and explosives commonly included are: Cartridges (rounds) for small arms, antipersonnel and antitank hand grenades, shells and missiles for light weapons, land mines, mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, and explosives (Laurence, 1998: Page 12) . Though several small arms and light weapons are very simple and quite easy to operate yet they are nonetheless very lethargic so that a small group of militants armed with the small arms and light weapons can constitute a big threat to an entire community of people (Laurence, 1998: Page 13). Ojatorotu and Okeke-Uzodike (2006) highlighted a significant relationship between the availability of small arms and light weapons and the prolonged violence in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

While reviewing the relationship between oil, arms proliferation and conflict in the Niger Delta, Ojatorotu and Okeke-Uzodike (2006: Page 88) observed that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has increased tension and aggravated ethnic clashes in the Niger Delta. Ojatorotu & Okeke-Uzodike (2006) explored the origin of the perennial oil violence in the Niger Delta region to the proliferation of small arms and weapons smuggled from Cameroun, Guinea-Bissau, and Gabon and also proffered some useful suggestions on how to end armed conflicts in the region by addressing the problems of proliferation of arms and light weapons. Ojatorotu and Okeke-Uzodike (2006) suggested that unless a lasting solution is found to the

fundamental issue of the indiscriminate possession and use of firearms in the oil-rich Niger Delta of Nigeria, oil violence will continue.

The core suggestion made in Ojatorotu & Okeke-Uzodike (2006: Page 101) was the need to maintain transparent fiscal policy and also resolve the fundamental question of Nigerian federalism and give the minorities a voice in a multi-ethnic and multicultural Nigeria. Though they concluded their research work and made their suggestions a few years before the introduction of the amnesty programme, yet the suggestions made then appears to still be very relevant at this time and for post-amnesty era. For example, guns in the hands of militancy-prone Niger Delta youth in the post-amnesty era could shatter the relative peace being assured by the amnesty offer. Ojatorotu & Okeke-Uzodike (2006) also suggested that the Nigerian government should address the problem of porous borders either on land or sea through which the illegal trafficking of small arms and light weapons usually take place by ensuring effective policing and monitoring.

In his analysis of the socio-economic effects of arms proliferation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, Badmus (2010) in his research work attempted to find appropriate answers to the following pertinent issues:

1. The socio-economic and political factors responsible for the proliferation of arms in the Niger Delta
2. The effects of arms proliferation on Niger Delta communities
3. How to solve the problem of arms proliferation in the Niger Delta

The major finding of Badmus' research was the failure of the Nigerian government to fulfil its social contract with the citizens. Recommendations put forward include the need to reconstruct the social contract through meeting the yearnings and aspirations of the citizenry (Badmus

2010). One important inference from this research work was the finding that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is not directly responsible for the oil violence experienced in the region though the arms and light weapons increased the intensity of the conflict. The findings of Badmus (2010) were in agreement with the findings of Ojakorotu and Okeke-Uzodike (2007) but Badmus went a little further by analysing the concept of social contract and suggested that doing a reconstruction of this contract with Nigerians as a whole and the inhabitants of Niger Delta in particular could guarantee peace in the Niger Delta. One of the ways suggested by Badmus (2010) which the social order in the entire nation could be revitalised is by improving the quality of the democratic process in the Nigerian nation. This as indicated by Badmus is arguably the focal point of building confidence in the mind of the different ethnic groups that constitute the national project called Nigeria. The ethnic minority groups like those that populate the Niger Delta want assurance that they are part of the common nation-state project or else, the perceived notion of political and socio-economic marginalisation will persist giving rise to the need for further agitation for self-governance through militancy and arms struggle (Solomon Ojo, 2011). In actual fact, if the Nigerian government fails to reconstruct its social contract with its people, criminal minded elements in the Niger Delta will continue to hide under the guise of perceived marginalisation to promote militancy and arms proliferation (Oluwaniyi, 2011b).

## **3.0. CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

### **3.1. INTRODUCTION**

In this section, theoretical strategies will be discussed as well as the mode of research for this project. This chapter seeks to explain the basis on which the data and the research results are based. It has been stated that it is highly important for a researcher to identify the research method to be used in a research and explain why it was chosen (Crotty, 1998). Stating the theoretical framework that supports the chosen research method is important as it helps the reader to have a better understanding of the proposed research. In line with this, this section will be looking at the types of research methods, the rationale behind the chosen method, types of investigation employed and ethical issues.

### **3.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

Firstly, the word methodology is how problems are approached and how the answers are sought. Put simply, it is how to carry out research. There are various research methods that can be employed when carrying out a research work, which will be discussed. Choosing a specific method will depend on many factors as the type of research work, the theoretical framework, constraints etc.

#### **3.2.1. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This type of research method seeks to collect descriptive data, to have an in depth understanding. It has its theoretical underpinnings from phenomenologists or interpretivists who believe that research should be conducted by analysing an individual's own perspective.

Qualitative research method emphasises on processes and meanings that cannot usually be quantified. Qualitative research involves data collection, analysis and interpretation of the data



in a way that cannot be measured, as is the case in quantitative research. The research question is not conclusive, as the findings are unpredictable. Under qualitative research, there are various methods, which include, interviews, case study, use of diaries, photographs and many more (Anderson, 2010).

The benefit of using qualitative research is the flexibility it gives a researcher in data collection and analysis, it allows a researcher to respond to changes that may occur along the course of a research work. A major limitation of the qualitative research is uncertainty. The results cannot be applied to a wider population, as the results of the research are usually not tested to find out if they are significant statistically as the case is with quantitative research methodology (Atieno, 2009).

Another drawback of this research method is that it can cause ambiguities; words can be subjective and have different meanings in different contexts to different people. This can cause inconsistency, making a researcher reach different conclusions even when using the same information.

### **3.2.2. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

The quantitative approach to research is premised on the theoretical framework of positivism. Positivists look at facts separate from the individual's perspective. They seek to quantify research variables using statistical methods such as frequency and correlations to show a link. By definition, quantitative methods involve gathering, analysing, interpreting and presenting research information in form of data. It is empirical in nature with researchers using statistical methods, which are objective as opposed to subjective in the case of the qualitative approach to reach their findings (Creswell, 2003).

The quantitative method is usually carried out by first starting with a hypothesis, which is then tested to prove or disprove the hypothesis (theory). Some methods used under this approach include the use of questionnaires, surveys, inventories etc.

Quantitative methods are best used to find factors that influence an outcome or to test a theory (Creswell, 2003). One of the strengths of using this method is that it is a more reliable approach as using numerical values means that analysis and findings is often considered to be reliable and objective. Another important strength is that quantitative research findings are more certain and there is no ambiguity as compared to the qualitative approach. This makes it the better approach to use in generalising findings made. As well as having strengths some drawbacks of using this method is as follows: it is more costly, it is one directional and does not give a fuller explanation on the complexities of human perceptions. There is also a possibility of it giving a false impression of homogeneity in a test.

### **3.2.3. MIXED METHODS**

With a changing trends in the way research is carried out over the years especially with the strong presence of the internet, it has been argued that the best approach to conducting research especially in social sciences is by employing both methods (Atieno, 2009). Creswell categorizes research methods into qualitative, quantitative and the mixed method. The mixed method approach is the most recent as it emerged in the past 20 years. It is a major research method employed by researchers in the social science field (Creswell, 2003).

Mixed methods approach is a combination of the qualitative and quantitative research methods. The researcher here, gathers, analyses, integrates the findings and reach conclusions based on the qualitative and quantitative approach.

### **3.3. CHOSEN RESEARCH DESIGN**

This research work uses the mixed methods approach, as it is a better approach because qualitative data can be coded quantitatively. Qualitative data can be converted to meaningful numerical values that can be interpreted to help get a better understanding of the meaning of the data and to help test specific hypotheses (Atieno, 2009).

This method creates a balance between the qualitative and quantitative methods in that their strengths can compensate for the weaknesses of each approach. This research work will be using the quantitative approach through the use of questionnaires to gather information to test four hypotheses. In addition to this, qualitative method is also used in this work through the use of case study analysis using at least two countries where amnesty was administered.

This work seeks to test four hypotheses. Using the positivist theory, it looks to address research questions and to prove the assertions the research work sets out to test in relation to an existing body of information within the context specifically mentioned. However, this study appears to be a one of the pioneer studies since less is known about the empirical evidence on the potential challenges of the post-amnesty peace building process. Hence, the potential impact of the post-amnesty programme in the Niger Delta has not been explored deeply by the past research studies, especially since the amnesty programme was still on-going in the course of this study. In an attempt at analysing the potential challenges that could militate against the peace-building process in the Niger Delta region in the post-amnesty period, four hypotheses were structured as stipulated in Chapter 1.

Therefore, the research study tested the two concepts of null and alternate hypotheses to unearth the grave impact the post-amnesty challenges could have on the on-going peace building process. The research study adopted a survey approach and is presumed that an open –ended

questionnaire will be issued to divergent categories of respondents in the Niger Delta, including some of the ex-militants.

The structured questionnaire aimed to elicit responses from a broad sample of people in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria including some of the ex-militants. This study sought to collect data on measurable parameters such as the socio-demographic information of the respondents, their perceptions about amnesty – whether they regard it as worthwhile or not and whether they nurse any fear about the amnesty programme. Questions that elicit responses about the main factors that make militancy attractive and the conceptions of the ex-militants who embraced amnesty about their counterparts who deserted amnesty are also included.

The mode by which the questionnaire was distributed to respondents was on a one-on –one distribution where the participants fill-in on the printed questionnaires. Survey was chosen as a more effective and faster way of getting responses from a broad range of people. The focus was just not on ex-militants as scholars like Ikoh & Ukpong focused on. Just like Ikoh & Ukpong (2013) focused their surveys on only militants, this set out to target groups of people beyond ex-militants which the researcher felt will benefit from the findings of the research study.

The questions in the questionnaire were similar in that same questions were asked but in positive and negative ways. This was done intentionally by the researcher balance out the questions and responses. Using only positive questions for example may give a ‘hawthorne effect’ (Creswell, 2003) where respondents skew responses because they know they are being studied and may give responses they feel the researcher expects. Using both styles of questions helped to even out and balance the responses.

### **3.4. DATA ANALYSIS PLAN**

To test these formulated hypotheses, this study will employ the statistical methods of percentage distributions and the mean rating of responses.

### **3.5. ETHICAL AND ACCESSIBILITY ISSUES**

When carrying out research, a researcher has to take into account ethical and data protection issues. This research study adopts an invitation plan approach. Thus, it aims to approach the participants and invite them fill the questionnaire that will be giving to them. In view of the above, there is the salient need to observe and be mindful of relevant ethical issues such as informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality of information obtained (Walter, 2006).

In taking into account of informed consent, it is important for the respondents to clearly understand the aims and objectives of the research that is being conducted and inform them of the option to withdraw from participation if they so desire. This was indicted in the questionnaire seen in the Appendices Section. The questionnaire dedicated a section by giving an introduction which explained the aims of the research work, also informing the participants of the different categories of people it aimed at being distributed to. Questions of how confidentiality will be maintained is also important. To protect the personal information of respondents and their responses and not revealing them to a third party without their express consent first sought and obtained. Issues of Anonymity and confidentiality were addressed by not including names and using a guide who was required to collect the filled in questionnaires as a bid to protect the identity of participants.

### **3.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE CHOSEN RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

The main limitation anticipated for this research study was that the researcher felt it was going to be difficult to get the ex-militants to complete the questionnaire given how sensitive the topic was and also given how volatile the region was, in terms of security. Thus, to obviate this challenge, the researcher intended to use a guide available in the Niger Delta to facilitate the effective and efficient distribution of the questionnaire and also to give the respondents ample time to submit the completed questionnaire.

Another limitation was the cost of conducting this research; it involved travelling to the location to distribute questionnaires and actually getting questionnaires filled. To get things done effectively and in a timely manner, the researcher thought that more money would be spent to encourage some participants especially in the local communities to get back filled questionnaires. There were obvious financial constraints especially in meeting the logistics and expenses incurred in the course of the research study. Therefore, to mitigate this financial requirement, this study limited data collection to the Rivers State area in Nigeria. This helped save the cost of transportation. The choice of River state was because it is a key state in the Niger Delta geopolitical zone, both in terms of its oil reserve and the flash points of militant activities.

Additionally, the research study intended to have a sample size of at least 100 respondents by distributing over 100 questionnaires. This figure was projected to be enough to create a pattern of responses that would be analysed to answer the questions raised. The research questionnaire was aimed to be distributed to a diverse category of people (ex militants, local community members, women, students, workers etc.) to get a broader perspective. Though this may not be a true of the representation of a wider population in the Niger Delta region.

More so, for the qualitative research aspect of this study, which employs the use of case study analysis, the challenge faced here is that, the type of amnesty programme used in Nigeria, is

unique and bears no exact similarities to other countries. It is not replicated anywhere else however, it is still useful to understand how amnesty was used as a conflict resolution mechanism in these countries (South Africa and Sierra Leone) to help improve the Amnesty Programme implemented in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Therefore analysis and conclusions reached in this research project are subjective and cannot be generalised.

When using qualitative research method it is important for bias to be controlled to prevent the researcher's subjective perceptions from influencing the research stud (Lock,Spirduso and Silverman, 2000).

## **4.0. CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDIES ON THE USE OF AMNESTY IN DIFFERENT SOCIETIES**

### **4.1. INTRODUCTION**

A number of literature shows that many societies across the globe have successfully used amnesties to rehabilitate transgressors of known laws, warring parties and armed groups, to collect resources like taxes that would otherwise have been lost or unrecoverable, and to reduce the level of resistance usually put up by delinquents to the enforcement of rules and regulations. Indeed, amnesty is a principle commonly used to achieve some stated objectives and, therefore, the use of amnesty differs from one society to another. This chapter looks to discuss the role of amnesty as a peace building mechanism for conflict resolution. It looks specifically at South Africa and Sierra Leona where amnesty has been successfully used to achieve certain objectives and attempts are also made to ascertain if the use of amnesty in each of these societies has been effective in terms of achieving the ultimate goal in each case. It also looks to compare its use in these societies to that adopted in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

A discussion on amnesty necessarily begins with a review, however brief, in terms of it being one of the tools for conflict resolution. Conflict may be defined as a situation of discord between any two or more persons or groups of persons. This dispute may centre on socio-economic, political, religious or ethnic interests and may be individual or collective. Conflicts may also be violent or non-violent. Society by its composite and segmental nature progresses or retrogresses by reason of conflict and conflict resolution. Hence conflict as a social phenomenon is said to be inevitable.

Traditionally, conflict resolution may take any one of three forms; the seeking of legal satisfaction for wrong-doing, the pursuit of personal vendetta and amnesty. In the preceding centuries, conflicts have traditionally been characterized by being international or inter-state in



scope but in recent times, conflicts have become increasingly internalized and with that gained increasing complexity and therefore seeming intractability as a result of the complex socio-politico-economic situations that create the basis for such conflicts in an increasingly globalized world. Consequently, the attention of the international peace community and other stakeholders in conflict resolution has shifted to internal conflicts.

The term amnesty can be described as ‘forgetfulness’ and is coined from the Greek word ‘Amnesia’. This encapsulates forgiveness which is significant for reconciliation. Forgiveness involves forgetting or pardoning crimes (Kituri, 2013: Page 2).

Essentially, amnesty is the granting of pardon to a person or group of persons who otherwise are guilty of crimes or offences that are punishable by the law. Amnesty is said to be a tool used politically for reconciliation and compromise after war (Kituri, 2013: Page 2). The power to grant amnesty usually is the exclusive preserve of governments and is usually administered either as an alternative or complimentary strategy for conflict resolution. Also an amnesty programme may involve a blanket amnesty offer or a conditional offer. Over the past two decades, there have been internal conflicts in many nations of the world such as rebellions and insurgencies as well as violent uprisings in Uganda, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Mali, Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia. Also, there have been some interracial clashes such as the ones that resulted from the apartheid policy of the white government in South Africa. Some of these conflicts have either been resolved or partially resolved through the application of amnesty programmes after several failed attempts to enforce a military solution. International observers and conflict analysts however are of different opinions as to how effective these amnesty programmes have been (Lederach, 1997).

#### **4.2. THE AMNESTY PACKAGE IN THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA**

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was instituted as one of the post-conflict initiatives following the triumph of the struggle against the white dominated apartheid rule in South Africa over the indigenous black population. Amnesty was incorporated into the reconciliation initiative for those who may have committed offenses that should have been punished under the laws of the sovereign nation of South Africa while the apartheid regime lasted. It is understandable that the majority of the population of the black people of South Africa opposed any forms of reconciliation that does not apportion the appropriate criminal punishment under the law to individuals who were once their white persecutors but Nelson Mandela who led the struggle that ended the obnoxious rule and his African National Congress(ANC) political party successfully persuaded the black population to avoid the spirit of hate campaign and the use of the law to get back at those who once oppressed them (Daniel, 2001: Page 27).

The persuasion of Nelson Mandela was hinged on the need to use amnesty to gain the trust of those who were once their persecutors and, therefore, avoid a situation where the horrors of the apartheid regime and the memory of the attendant war between the white South Africans and the black South Africans who were in the majority continue to hunt the people of South Africa (Daniel, 2001: Page 27). However, in order to ensure that the amnesty package achieve its purpose of true reconciliation, some stringent conditions were inserted into the terms of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. One of these conditions states that:

“The commission would respect the ANC’s promise to offer amnesties, but the reprieve would not be granted automatically. It would, rather, be linked to a demand for full disclosure from perpetrators” (Abrahamsen & Merwe, 2005: Page 1). Individuals who want to be given an amnesty have to go through an application process where they provide information detailing their actions and establishing that their actions were solely politically motivated and not because of other reasons as sadism, greed etc. (Daniel, 2001: Page 29; Jardine, 2008: Page 5).

Remorse or repentance were not requirements for granting amnesty to perpetrators by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Baron, 2015).

It further states that it would not be compulsory for applicants to apologize and the amnesty offer means discharging both criminal responsibility and also civil liability (Daniel, 2001: Page 29).

Expectedly, many people have raised questions over the legality, the moral justification, and the legitimacy of the power of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to grant or deny amnesty to individuals who owned up on issues that warrant amnesty. While some people may not have seen any reason with the approach of exchanging truth for amnesty as contained in the terms of the reconciliation committee, there actually exists a lot of sense. For example, the method of extracting information in exchange for pardon was a plausible way of gathering important information that could be analysed to understand the main root causes of the protracted crisis as well as the depth of criminal activities that actually took place during the crisis. The ultimate reason was to enable those in authority to understand the root causes of the crisis and also formulate the right policy that would bring a lasting resolution among the people of South Africa (Jardine, 2010).

Those who criticised the form of the amnesty package offered by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa were basically in two categories. While one category felt that the approach opened up facts that could aggravate the state of the wounded psyche of the oppressed people, the other category hinged their criticism on the fact the method obstructed justice and prevented individuals that should have faced the wrath of the law for gross human rights abuses and other transgressions punishable under the South African law (Jardine, 2010).

Therefore, the basis under which each category of the critics of this form of amnesty approach depends on their perceptions in relation to its credibility and legality but it is now obvious that

this approach was a way of extending sympathy to individuals who were the oppressors by being political generous rather than using the truthful testimonies as a tool for directing retaliatory justice (Eisikovis Nir, 2006: Page 502).

Though the South African approach to amnesty offer could not be conceived as being perfect yet despite all the perceived shortcomings, it provided some reprieved in many ways that succeeded in igniting the fire of trust in the system and among the people irrespective of racial differences and political alignments. For example, some individuals who should have been tried for murder were set free and the approach also shed some light into the dark side of life under the apartheid government of South Africa (Jardine, 2010). Notwithstanding some benefits of the amnesty package as offered in South Africa to end the protracted conflict the country went through for several years, the amnesty programme failed to provide real resolution and among the races and the people of South Africa who demanded justice. The justice system under South Africa's TRC failed with the amnesty process. It denied people the opportunity to take out civil actions for damages as in some case, 'bread winners' of some families were killed (Jardine, 2010).

Despite these shortcomings, amnesty employed by South Africa's TRC was effective with positive aspects which Nigeria can learn from. One of the most beneficial aspects of the programme was that it helped in building trust in the system. It was used to unravel events that occurred during the apartheid. Another positive was that it focused on the victims to heal the apartheid past and not just the perpetrators. With this focus, the process helped to gather information that may help the South African Government to understand the deep rooted causes of the conflict and get an in depth knowledge of criminal activities that took place (Jardine, 2010: Page 60). This information was helpful as it may guide the government in formulating the right policies for conflict resolution for lasting peace. In summary, the application of amnesty through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission provide an example of how to

exceptionally adapt amnesty as a technique for addressing post conflict suffering and psychological stress in a society.

### **4.3. AMNESTY AS ADMINISTERED BY THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SIERRA LEONE**

A review of amnesty as offered by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Sierra Leone may shed more light on how effective amnesties have been used in resolving conflicts. The TRC of Sierra Leone was established based on the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 (Teale , 2009). The commission was later given a legal backing by the TRC Act of 2000. Sierra Leone used the TRC to gather statements through public hearings that were staged from December 2002 to September 2003. The commission submitted its completed report in October 2004. The commission pursued the goal of establishing different types of legal resolutions through the Court and, hence, it succeeded in supplementing prosecutions in some instances (Teale , 2009). The TRC of Sierra Leone established itself as being victim-focused and forward-looking as compared to the Court. The main intention of the TRC was to encourage healing and reconciliation among the people despite the bitter experiences of the past, provide an unbiased past record, assuage the wounds of victims, put impunity in its right perspective, and establish a standard that will discourage a repetition of the atrocities of the past (Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000).

Apart from the TRC, Sierra Leone also established the Special Court for Sierra Leone with the help of the United Nations Security Council to serve as a parallel body to address the evils that were perpetuated during the period of the protracted conflict (Adenuga , 2007). The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established to make those who engineered the evils to defend themselves in a competent court of jurisdiction. The plan was that instead of just making the people to reveal the truth and proceed to forgive and forget the evils done during the decade long war, the government was after true reconciliation among the people as well as ensuring

that there was no repeat of the extreme wrong doings. Therefore, instead of granting blanket amnesty to the culprits of the atrocities, the plan was to make those who were most responsible for the evils to face the wrath of the law (Adenuga , 2007).

However, very few individuals were indicted by the Special Court being among those individuals considered to have borne the greatest responsibility for the crimes committed during the conflict. In a study to compare the level of effectiveness of the amnesty granted by both South Africa and Sierra Leone using quantitative technique, it was claimed that South Africa achieved more in terms of reconciliation and reintegration of offenders with its amnesty offer when compared with Sierra Leone (Smith, 2010). Teale (2009) observed that inaction in implementing the Sierra Leone TRC report was responsible for the seemingly lack of effectiveness of the reconciliation and peace-building efforts of the Sierra Leonean government with the TRC and the amnesty programme that accompanied the national truth and reconciliation drive. From available records, the decade long armed struggle and civil war in Sierra Leone gained publicity and a lot of notoriety in the international community because of several atrocities that were committed (Teale, 2009). Evil deeds like amputations, rape, violence against women and children, conscripting children to carry arms and fight in the war as child soldiers were committed. The blood diamond episode due to the unethical diamond mining, and the unethical influence of Charles Taylor, the Liberian warlord, in the conflict was also a factor (Teale, 2009). Overall, experts observed that it was unthinkable that those who constituted the reconciliation process delayed the implementation of the recommendations of the TRC report.

Teale (2009) notes that:

Although the report with recommendations was made in 2004, the Government of Sierra Leone failed in its legal duty to implement the recommendations. The government did next to nothing

in ensuring that the recommendations made were put in practice as this was seen with inadequate funding to put an independent monitoring institution in place. Civil society groups lobby efforts to turn the recommendations to a 'TRC Omnibus Bill' turned out unsuccessful. President Koroma after his election in 2007, in his first major speech promised to set up a follow-up committee to ensure that TRC recommendations would be enforced, however as of January 2009, there was no follow up committee or any form of implementation of the TRC recommendations (Teale, 2009: Page 83).

#### **4.4. SOUTH AFRICAN TRC V. SIERRA LEONEAN TRC AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AMNESTY SUCCESS IN NIGERIA**

Like South Africa, Sierra Leone used the TRC as a transitional justice process whereby the two countries were slowly restored to a state of normalcy where mutual trust prevails after a protracted conflict and records of instances that indicates a wide spread of gross human right abuses. The goal of the TRC was to reveal truth with a provision for amnesty similar to the Niger Delta amnesty but the challenge was how to use the TRC combined with amnesty offer to obtain true reconciliation among the people. Besides, both countries had sunk into full blown conflicts such that to revert back to democratic governance requires surmounting the challenge of reacting as appropriately as possible to past extreme wrong doings without undermining the prospects for future growth and development or jeopardising the quest to build the countries up in an atmosphere of new democracy (Crocker, 2000). In contrast to South Africa and the Sierra Leone, no truth and reconciliation commission was constituted in Nigeria as a precursor to amnesty offer. In fact, amnesty was offered to any ex-militant that accepts the amnesty offer by renouncing militancy, surrendering their weapons and embracing the terms and conditions of the amnesty programme. Therefore, the Niger Delta conflict in Nigeria differs considerably in many ways from the fight by the different ethnic nationalities for supremacy in Sierra Leone

and the struggle by the black people of South Africa for emancipation from the apartheid rule championed by the South African white minority.

However, the Niger Delta conflict could be regarded as perhaps more multifaceted if we take a look at the many issues involved and also, the parties involved in the resource control struggle that though was of internal nature yet has been considered to have assumed international scale for the notoriety of the militants. The oil-rich south-south region of Nigeria has been characterised by agitation on one hand and arm struggle and militancy on the other hand since crude oil was discovered in the region in the early part of 1970. Since after the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities, the economy of the country shifted from being based on agricultural produce like groundnut, cocoa and palm oil to complete reliance on the revenues from the sale of the Niger Delta oil. Unfortunately, the entire environment of the Niger Delta has now become one of the most polluted places on earth as at today so that the Niger Delta region could be regarded as one of the poorest in the Nigerian nation yet the region was once regarded as the agricultural pride of West Africa due to its vast agricultural resources like fertile land which was good for farming, fish and sundry water-based creatures commonly found in rivers, creeks and coastal waters. This was the genesis of the protracted conflict that ravaged the entire Niger Delta for decades and by consequence, impacted the oil revenues from the region leading to the offer of amnesty.

While pronouncing an amnesty offer to the militants, the Nigerian President made a reference to the fact that the challenges in the Niger Delta arose as a result of the failings of successive administrations to meet the demands of the people leading to the alarming level of restiveness being witnessed in the region. Overall, the high incidence of the negative effects of the activities of the militants in the Niger Delta region led to the amnesty initiatives in the first place. From the foregoing, it is obvious that the amnesty offer of the government of Nigeria were conceived, planned and implemented under different circumstances when compared with



the circumstances that warranted the use of TRC and amnesty in South Africa and in Sierra Leone.

Conflict and its resolution has been the concern of governments and international agencies for a long time and necessarily have attracted the attention of social scientists, political analysts and world observers over time. Therefore, conflict and its resolution have attracted critical analysis leading to the postulation of several theories and strategies regarding conflict resolution. A salient question in this regard concerns the issue of when one can definitely say that a particular conflict has been resolved. It is argued that conflict develops and resolves in stages which have been identified as the pre-conflict stage, contradiction stage, polarization stage, risky situation stage, confrontation stage, violence stage and de-escalation/ resolution stage (Adebayo, 2007).

The definition of conflict resolution often depends on who is making it. To some, violent conflict is said to be resolved when the warring parties lay down their arms and the violence comes to an end. However, the deepest level of conflict resolution is achieved only when true peace is restored, relationships fully restored and the structural situations that led to the conflict in the first instance have been redefined in ways that will fully engender peace and progress. In this regard, peace was arguably restored in the case of South Africa and Sierra Leone however, for South Africa, a major criticism is that the TRC did not address structural violations (institutional) and relationships were not fully restored as most victims still demanded justice (Jardine, 2010: Page 59). In the case of the Niger Delta, it can be argued that the deepest level of conflict resolution has not been achieved as true peace that is sustainable is yet to be achieved. Lederach (1997) viewed conflict resolution as being synonymous with development while others see it as whatever kind of settlement achieved. Conflict resolution generally speaking can be seen in three different phases: conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict transformation. Conflict prevention as a concept was developed by

Ghali (1992) who defined it as preventive and limiting action aimed at stopping conflict from happening or limiting it in case of occurrence. It is argued that prevention is of two strains. The first is structural prevention, which is targeted at removing potential sources of conflict by reorganizing societal structures that inherently could engender conflict. The other one is operational prevention which is intervention by the military or quasi-military groups, either directly or indirectly to limit or prevent the escalation of armed conflict (Laurence, 1998).

Unfortunately, with respect to the Niger Delta, the preventive stage of conflict management was totally neglected. For example, the degradation of the Niger Delta land and waters were caused mainly by oil spills but these spills were either not cleaned up at all or cleaned up after much damage had been done (Obi, 2009).

A report by the UNDP indicates that over 6,817 oil spills took place between 1976 and 2001 in the Niger Delta region (Oluwaniyi, 2011b). This report probably attests to a culture of impunity and disregard for the environment which multinational oil companies continually perpetuated in the Niger Delta with the active connivance of the Nigerian government. Perhaps the Niger Delta crisis would have been totally avoided if the right preventive measures were applied early enough.

Though available record shows that some of the initiatives for the infrastructural development of the Niger Delta of Nigeria started in 1961 with the formation of the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) but it was not until 2010, some forty-nine years after, that a body called the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) was established to monitor the Niger Delta environment and act swiftly when there is any need for clean-up of oil spills. Several other state institutions such as the Niger Delta Basin and Rural Development Authority (NDBRDA) which was established by Decree 37 in 1976 and other programs were established in quick succession. In 1992, the Decree 23 was enacted to establish the

OMPADEC and this was followed by the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) in 1996. In 2000, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was established by an act of the parliament. In 2009, a separate ministry was established in the Federal Civil Service to look after the development of this troubled region and was christened the Ministry of the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Besides, Delta and Ondo States separately established oil producing areas development commissions (DESOPADEC and OSOPADEC respectively) to tackle the problem of underdevelopment and environmental degradation brought on by the explorations of crude oil in these two states. The government of President Olusegun Obasanjo also increased oil revenue allocation for the Niger Delta region from zero to 13% in addition to the normal statutory revenue allocations due to each state of the federation from the Nigerian federation accounts (Oluwaniyi, 2011b).

All these appear to be efforts made when the angers of the common Niger Delta people were reaching the boiling point. Also, the people were really not appeased by the numerous government agencies established in quick succession since the environmental conditions have become so chronic such that the people did not really see any major changes in their living conditions (Obi, 2009).

Having looked at how South Africa and Sierra Leone employed Amnesty along with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a peace building tool, the Nigeria could draw lessons from them even though the type of conflict (in the case of Nigeria, resource conflicts) bears no exact similarities.

In the case of South Africa, full pardon was granted to perpetrators but in Sierra Leone, pardon was granted with a possibility that perpetrators could still be prosecuted by a special court (The TRC and The Special Court, 2004).

South Africa's case is similar to that of the Niger Delta where a full pardon was given to militants. However, a striking similarity in all three countries is that amnesty was granted conditionally. In South Africa it was granted on the condition that perpetrators will give 'full disclosure', in Sierra Leone on the condition that fighting stopped while in Nigeria's Niger Delta on the condition that arms and weapons given up as part of the DDR programme incorporated into the amnesty package. Another interesting point to look at is how amnesty was granted in these countries. For South Africa, amnesty was granted on a high standard and requirement. Perpetrators were required to tender in an amnesty application which was not a guarantee of amnesty. According to reports, in a 7 year period from 1996, about 7,000 perpetrators made amnesty applications but not up to 1,000 perpetrators got (Kweyam,2012) . In Sierra Leone, amnesty was granted once the Lome Agreement was signed but this did not bar perpetrators from prosecution under the jurisdiction of the special courts. In the case of the Niger Delta, the standard for the grant of amnesty was not high, it required militants to denounce militancy by only renouncing and surrendering weapons. Also another important aspect of the amnesties in both South Africa and Sierra Leone is that it was not too focused on the perpetrators but the main focus was on the victims. The Niger Delta's amnesty places too much focus on the militants and excludes other important vulnerable groups of people (as women, children and grassroots community) in these societies that are actually victims of environmental pollution and high levels of poverty and unemployment hugely contributed by the ill management of oil revenues derived from the Niger Delta region. This is a feature that the amnesty in Nigeria should emulate.

A positive feature of both amnesties in South Africa and Sierra Leone that the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta should also emulate is trying to understand the historical root causes of these conflict. One of the successes of both amnesties is that they aimed at uncovering the truth, by these means, gathering information used to recommend policies and prevent future

violations and conflicts. This is clearly lacking in the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta amnesty programme which can be argued to be treating the results of the root causes of the conflicts.

## **5.0. CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION**

#### **5.1. INTRODUCTION**

In this section, the analysis and the interpretation of the data gathered will be looked at. Due to the paucity of research studies on this topic, the researcher felt strongly the need to consider the following research question:

*Could the amnesty programme be rationally taken as adequate in bringing lasting peace to this troubled oil-rich region of Nigeria?*

For the purposes of this research study, the research question will be broken down and defined for more clarity. These terms can be defined in a subjective way but in these context, ‘rationally’ here means what is reasonable, what will be considered by the majority of the population as reasonable. The use of ‘adequate’ in this context refers to the right standard, what will be sufficient. ‘Lasting peace’ for the purposes of this research study can be referred to as peace that is sustainable, peace in the long run. Peace that will ensure that the previous state of continuous violence and high levels of insecurity, is not reverted to. Lasting peace here means an end to high levels of insecurity, socio- economic loss caused by militant activities and aggrieved ethnic groups. In simpler words, this research aims to assess whether the amnesty programme is effective enough to bring sustainable peace to the Niger Delta region.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the perceptions of the people of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria about the amnesty programme and its ability to secure a lasting peace for the oil-rich Niger Delta. To achieve this purpose, this study used the quantitative research method to investigate how the people of the Niger Delta felt about the amnesty programme and whether they thought it will usher in a lasting peace or not. The approach of quantitative research

method used for this study combined survey design methodology and case study analysis of relevant amnesty programmes to provide answers to the research questions in line with the most acceptable norms among researchers (Creswell, 2003). This chapter discusses the findings of the data collected plus the findings of this thesis in relation to the relevant literatures already reviewed.

The data collected for this research was primarily based on field survey. Field survey was conducted through the use of structured questionnaire, though the study hoped to collect at least 100 responses for practical reasons, responses from the number of questionnaires administered, only forty-five (45) completed responses were returned. This is linked to some of the monetary limitations identified in chapter 3. It should be noted however, that the eventual number of respondents is arguably sufficient. The concept of data saturation in research provides a reasonable explanation for this. It is the moment where data collected from research is sufficient to answer the research questions, where research comes back with the same responses. A point where data does not give any new information, and continuing to collect data will mean collecting same pattern of responses (Walker, 2012). The projected number of responses was not achieved, however, 45 respondent is a lot and sufficient to get consistent data for data analysis.

## **5.2. CONSTRUCT RELIABILITY ANALYSIS**

In trying to establish a link from the set of items in the construct, Cronbach alpha measure was used. It was chosen as it is one of the most commonly used to determine the internal consistency of a questionnaire. Cronbach alpha is a measure that assesses the internal consistency or average correlation of a set of survey items. In other words, it is used to gauge scale reliability. The cronbach alpha yielded in this study was calculated to be 0.527.

**Table 1.0: Determination of internal consistency in the construct using Cronbach alpha**

<b>Cronbach alpha</b>	<b>Number of items</b>
<b>0.527</b>	<b>12</b>

### **5.3 EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES**

In an attempt at analysing the potential challenges that could militate against the peace-building process in the Niger Delta region in the post-amnesty period, four hypotheses were stipulated. To test these formulated hypotheses, percentage distributions and the mean-rating of their responses were used as presented in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 below.

**H<sub>0</sub> = 1: In all probability, the amnesty programme, as planned and executed by the Federal Government of Nigeria, is not sufficient to bring lasting peace to the Niger Delta region**

In testing this hypothesis, three questions (independent variables) were designed to elicit responses as to what respondents perceive to be the fundamental cause of the violence in the region, content of the amnesty package, and whether the package would bring lasting peace to the region. 73.3% of the respondents believe that negligence on the part of the Federal Government of Nigeria was not the root cause of violence in the region. This position may have led to why 60% of them affirmed that the amnesty package was comprehensive enough even to the extent of bringing lasting peace to the region with over 70 per cent of the respondents, with the mean rating of 2.80 – which is the highest, avowing to the adequacy of the amnesty package (see Table 2.0 below).

**Table 2.0: Rating of Respondents’ beliefs about the amnesty package (%)**

	<b>SA</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>DA</b>	<b>SDA</b>	<b>Mean score</b>



<b>Total neglect as the main factor for militancy</b>	<b>4.4% (2)</b>	<b>22.2%(10)</b>	<b>33.3% (15)</b>	<b>40% (18)</b>	<b>1.93</b>
<b>Amnesty programme not comprehensive enough</b>	<b>6.7%(3)</b>	<b>33.3%(15)</b>	<b>33.3%(15)</b>	<b>26.7%(12)</b>	<b>2.20</b>
<b>The amnesty programme is adequate...</b>	<b>15.6%(7)</b>	<b>55.6%(25)</b>	<b>22.2%(10)</b>	<b>6.7%(3)</b>	<b>2.80</b>
				<b>Total respondents = 45</b>	

**SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; DA = Disagree; SDA= Strongly Disagree**

**Source: Field survey (May, 2014)**

Thus, their responses do not support the assertion that the amnesty programme is not sufficient to bring lasting peace to the region. The socio-demographic distribution of the respondents reveals that none of them was a militant however, other respondents were also relevant stakeholders and over 60 % of them were either gainfully employed or were students. The violence that erupted in the region prior to the launching of the amnesty programme almost brought to a halt the socio-economic activity of Nigeria, caused loss of lives, and hundreds of people were kidnapped in the region (Oluwaniyi, 2011b). However, with the implementation of the amnesty package and the consequent restoration of normalcy to the region, people could go back to their means of livelihood or whatever it was they were doing before the mayhem broke out with little or no fear of being kidnapped or caught in the cross fire between the militants and the army. This perhaps could explain the respondents' position that the amnesty package would probably bring a lasting peace to the region. In addition, they also felt that the amnesty package contained answers to the demands of the militants as evidenced by the mean score response of 2.8 when asked whether the amnesty package was adequate.

**H<sub>0</sub> = 2: The continued prevalence of small arms and light weapons in the Niger Delta region points to the possibility that violence will erupt in the near future**

In analysing this assertion, the possibility that the amnesty package will impact positively on the socio-economic condition of the region was examined. Questions that will enable the determination of the success of the implementation of the amnesty package with respect to small arms and the mop-up exercise of light weapons were crafted. Table 3.0 shows that over 80% of the respondents believe that the arms and light weapons mop-up exercise which was part of the disarmament and amnesty package, was successfully carried out and as such they do not subscribe to the school of thought that small arms and light weapons are still prevalent in the region. However, when asked about the prospect of the amnesty improving the socio-economic conditions of the region, there were many differing opinions as over 60% of them do not concur that the amnesty package would boost the socio-economic activities of the Niger Delta people. What this implies was that there is no positive correlation between the amnesty package and the socio-economic condition of the region.

**Table 3.0: Respondents’ responses to the prevalence of small arms and light weapons in the Niger Delta region (%)**

	<b>SA</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>DA</b>	<b>SDA</b>	<b>Mean score</b>
<b>Amnesty package will improve socio-economic conditions of Niger Delta people</b>	<b>2.2%(1)</b>	<b>31.1%(14)</b>	<b>44.4%(20)</b>	<b>22.2%(10)</b>	<b>2.20</b>
<b>Small arms and light weapons are still prevalent in Niger Delta</b>	<b>0% (0)</b>	<b>11.1%(5)</b>	<b>20% (9)</b>	<b>68.9%(31)</b>	<b>1.42</b>

<b>Arms mop-up exercise was not effective</b>	<b>0%(0)</b>	<b>15.6%(7)</b>	<b>26.7%(12)</b>	<b>57.8%(26)</b>	<b>1.58</b>
				<b>Total respondents = 45</b>	

**SA = Strongly agree; A = Agree; DA = Disagree; SDA = Strongly disagree**

**Source: Field survey (May, 2014)**

These findings did not support the second hypothesis which stipulates that the prevalence of arms and light weapons in the Niger Delta region points to the possibility that violence will erupt in the near future. In the second hypothesis, it is presumed that there is proliferation of small arms and light weapons and this assumption led to the prediction of violence in the near future (Ikoh and Ukpong, 2013). However, the respondents believe that the assumption is wrong with an overwhelming 80% of them refusing to buy into it and part of the reasons for this stance could be deduced from their perception about the effectiveness of the arms mop-up exercise (disarmament); the mean score for prevalence of arms and the mop-up exercise were 1.42 and 1.58 respectively thus suggesting that majority of the respondents did not concur with the notion contained in this hypothesis.

It is also evident from the table that a larger percentage (66.6%) of the respondents could not link the amnesty package to improved socio-economic condition in the Niger Delta region. Since the amnesty package was solely designed for the militants, it is conceivably possible that this could have engendered the belief that no economic gain would come from the package. Actually, the amnesty package consists of three items, namely; demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of the ex-militants into the civil society (DDR) (Ikoh and Ukpong, 2013). One could see that the amnesty programme is targeted at the ex-militants and it is crucial for peace-building process. However, the dimensions of this process include changes in the personal, structural, relational and cultural aspects of the conflicts (Ikoh and Ukpong,2013),

and as such, it will require more than just amnesty package to improve the socio-economic conditions of this region.

**H<sub>0</sub> = 3: Non-adoption of bottom-up approach to the amnesty programme will significantly affect the post-amnesty peace-building process**

To test this hypothesis, I examined some of the effects of the fallouts of the non-adoption of bottom-up approach such as non-acceptance of the amnesty programme by some ex-militants, the presence of negligible small arms and light weapons in the hands of ex-militants that refused the amnesty offer, and the amnesty deserters. I also wanted to know what they thought about the amnesty offer. Hence, three questions were designed in line with these objectives. According to Table 4, over 80% of the respondents believe that the non-acceptance of the amnesty offer by some militants will not jeopardize the peace-building process, yet more than 60% of them disagreed outright with the assertion that the amnesty offer and arms mop-up exercise were effectively implemented. But when asked whether the negligible small arms and weapons could threaten the post-amnesty peace-building efforts, over 50% of them said it would not.

**Table 4.0: Respondents’ ratings of some of the fallouts and the impact of non-adoption of bottom-up approach of the amnesty package on post amnesty peace-building process**

	<b>SA</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>DA</b>	<b>SDA</b>	<b>Mean score</b>
Non-acceptance of amnesty offer will affect peace-building process	<b>0%(0)</b>	<b>17.8%(8)</b>	<b>64.4%(29)</b>	<b>17.8%(8)</b>	<b>2.0</b>
Presence of negligible small arms will not affect post-amnesty peace-building process	<b>26.7%(12)</b>	<b>28.9%(13)</b>	<b>42.2%(19)</b>	<b>2.2%(1)</b>	<b>2.8</b>
The amnesty offer was very effective	<b>17.8%(8)</b>	<b>15.6%(7)</b>	<b>64.4%(29)</b>	<b>2.2%(1)</b>	<b>2.49</b>

and would prevent future violence					
				<b>Total respondents = 45</b>	

**Source: Field survey (May, 2014)**

It is generally believed that because the amnesty package did not completely meet the expectation of the ex-militants largely owing to the fact that they were not consulted in the formulation of the package as in bottom-up approach to conflict resolution. Bottom-up approach is an approach that considers the views and feelings of those on the lower rung of the ladder among the ex-militants. Some of them abandoned the amnesty offer claiming that it only satisfied the yearnings of their group leaders (Obi and Rustad, 2011). This rejection of the amnesty offer by some of the ex-militants has led to a wide spread apprehension that they may rehash the conflict in the Niger Delta region in the near future. However, the respondents believe otherwise with over 80% debunking this assertion. There were dissenting opinions with respect to whether or not the amnesty would result in a sustainable peace in the region; but over 60% of them believe that the non-adoption of the bottom-up approach of the amnesty package will adversely affect the post-amnesty peace-building process but probably not because of the existence of negligible small arms and light weapons, and definitely not because of the non-acceptance of the amnesty offer. This position therefore supports the third hypothesis.

**H<sub>0</sub> = 4: The benefits expected from the amnesty programme significantly differ from the amnesty package offered eventually**

This hypothesis was formulated based on the general perception that the amnesty package does not truly reflect the yearnings of the ex-militants (Obi and Rustad, 2011). Thus, to evaluate the veracity of this assertion, we crafted questions along this line. Table 5 shows that over 70% of the respondents believe that the non-inclusion of the militants in decisions regarding the formulation of the amnesty package will affect the post-amnesty peace-building process. In

addition, more than 60% of them also concurred with the fact that the ex-militants who received the amnesty package were not satisfied with the programme. While 53.3% believes that the amnesty programme will not necessarily translate to improved welfare for the ex-militants.

**Table 5.0: Respondents' ratings of the suitability of the amnesty package**

	<b>SA</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>DA</b>	<b>SDA</b>	<b>Mean score</b>
Non-inclusion of the ex-militants in planning the amnesty programme will affect peace building	<b>28.9%(13)</b>	<b>48.9%(22)</b>	<b>15.6%(7)</b>	<b>6.7% (3)</b>	<b>3.13</b>
The amnesty package was satisfactory	<b>24.4%(11)</b>	<b>11.1%(5)</b>	<b>44.4%(20)</b>	<b>20%(9)</b>	<b>2.44</b>
Amnesty offer will not improve welfare of ex-militants...	<b>13.3%(6)</b>	<b>33.3%(15)</b>	<b>28.9%(13)</b>	<b>24.4%(11)</b>	<b>2.38</b>
				<b>Total respondents = 45</b>	

**Source: Field survey (May, 2014)**

The findings support the assertion that the benefits expected from the amnesty package differ significantly from what the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) delivered. Since, the beneficiaries of the amnesty package were excluded from the decisions concerning the programme, it stands to reason therefore that the package will by no means meet the demands and aspirations of the ex-militants. It is therefore conceivable that this miscalculation by the FGN may eventually threaten the peace building process with majority of the respondents responding with the highest mean score of 3.13.

It should be noted that this assertion needs to be toned down as this particular hypothesis needed responses from ex-militants, however, the research carried out by Ikoh & Ukpong

(2013) helped in informing this research study to argue that ex-militants may support this assertion as indicated in their research.

In this present study, the researcher tried to examine some of the challenges that could beset the post-amnesty peace-building process in the Niger Delta region, and to achieve this, the researcher formulated these challenges into four hypotheses which were then tested through the administration of questionnaire to civilians living within this violence-prone region. There is no arguing the fact that several literatures (Obi and Rustad, 2011; Ikoh and Ukpong, 2013; Oluwaniyi, 2011) have in the recent past averred that the amnesty programme will not significantly bring sustainable peace to the Niger Delta region due to the following reasons:

1. The continued prevalence of small arms and light weapons in the region.
2. Non-adoption of bottom-up approach to the amnesty programme.
3. The amnesty package failed to meet the expectations of the ex-militants.

These reasons formed the bases for crafting hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 but against expectations, hypotheses 1 and 2 were debunked by the research findings while hypotheses 3 and 4 were supported.

The overall point to be taken from the challenges of a smaller sample size than expected and the inability to receive responses from ex-militant is that this has limited the power of the researcher to reach conclusions

#### **5.4. THE SUMMARY OF THE KEY FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY**

*The main findings of this research was that the amnesty programme could rationally be taken as adequate in bringing lasting peace to the troubled oil-rich region of the Niger Delta of Nigeria but the non-adoption of bottom-up approach to the amnesty programme and the failure*

*of the amnesty package to meet the expectations of the ex-militants might significantly affect the post-amnesty peace-building process in the long run.*

Four hypotheses were formulated based on the relevant literatures and the statistical results obtained reflected the main findings stated above. 70 percent of the respondents which accounts for 2.80 mean rating avowed to the adequacy of the amnesty package and 60 percent of the respondents affirmed that the amnesty package was comprehensive enough even to the extent that it will bring lasting peace to the region. However, over 60% of the respondents believed that the non-adoption of the bottom-up approach of the amnesty package will adversely affect the post-amnesty peace-building process and more than 60% of them also concurred with the fact that the ex-militants who received the amnesty package were not satisfied with the programme in line with earlier conclusion of Obi and Rustad (2011).

Perhaps there appears to be some rational reasons why the key findings of this study sounds some caveats as to the ability of the Nigerian government to continue to sustain the prevailing post-amnesty peace-building process. In the first instance, the package of the Niger Delta amnesty offer drew its schemes from the programme of the traditional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) for the ex-militants. The main focus of the DDR centers on the need to reintegrate the ex-militants to civil lifestyle once they disarm and demobilize. However, this aim appeared to have neglected a range of the dynamics that generated militancy in the oil rich region in the first instance (Ukoh and Ukpong, 2013 and Oluwaniyi, 2011b).

## **5.5. DISCUSSION ON WHY A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED IN DESIGNING THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME AND ITS PACKAGE FOR THE NIGER DELTA EX-MILITANTS**



A number of studies have already established that the category of militias that terrorised the Niger Delta region were never homogenous but there were two broad categories of youth militias identifiable in the Niger Delta (Ako, 2011 & Ikelegbe, 2011). The two categories were the genuine militants and the criminalized militants. The militias belonged to different factions and their allegiance were pledged to different leaders. Undoubtedly, some groups of the militias canvassed for the overall growth and development of the oil rich region, some others were only interested in acquiring wealth for themselves through several illegal and criminal activities that included oil bunkering, kidnapping and piracy. Such clear differences as stated above complicate the categorisation of the militia groups and, hence, prevent the use of one strategy which is the amnesty offer as the sole strategy for winning over the militias to the side of peace. According to Ako (2011) and Ikelegbe (2011), militias that operate in the Niger Delta with criminal intentions do so mainly as gunmen in small cults and gangs. This observation also implies that a successful amnesty package should have sought the opinions of each group, especially those who were involved in the agitation for the development of the region and incorporate any of the agreeable useful inputs into the amnesty programmes by way of bottom-up approach to ensure peace reigns in the region.

According to a report by the United Nations on the impacts of amnesty and the use of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration, the adoption of bottom-up inputs as a paradigm shift from the traditional approach has been observed to work as a sure guarantee for the success of peace negotiations during conflicts (United Nations, 2006; Ikoh and Ukpong, 2013 and Oluwaniyi, 2011). It was argued that such bottom-up inputs provide opportunity and an in-depth understanding of the forces at work that eventually led to the conflict (United Nations, 2006). The researcher also argues that the bottom-up inputs could also have provided Nigerian authority the prospect of understanding the perceived threats and fears of all categories of the ex-militants and, hence, develop a more programmatic amnesty offer that

would not have been resisted by any of the different groups and could have prevented incidences where some of the ex-militants who initially accepted the amnesty offer later became deserters. In addition, it has also been established that a successful amnesty programme where armed conflicts were involved must be carried out with the full consultation and collaboration of all groups and members of the factions and with all stakeholders and it must apply incentives appropriate to the people.

The bottom up approach can arguably be linked to South Africa and Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Commission where the governments of these countries sought to find the truth in helping to understand the root causes for conflict management and prevention in the future. Including both victims and perpetrators can arguably be a part of the bottom up approach.

## **5.6. DISCUSSION ON THE GENERAL BELIEVE THAT THE AMNESTY PACKAGE FAILED TO MEET THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE EX-MILITANTS**

The other caveat to the key findings of this study was based on the general believe both within the ranks of the ex-militants and among the civil society of the Niger Delta inhabitants as recorded by Obi and Rustad (2011); Ikoh and Ukpong (2013) and Oluwaniyi (2011). To test this impression, a hypothesis was structured as follow:

*The benefits expected from the amnesty programme significantly differ from the amnesty package offered eventually*

This hypothesis was formulated based on the general perception that the amnesty package does not truly reflect the yearnings of the ex-militants (Obi and Rustad, 2011). The analysis of the responses to the formulated questions showed that more than 60% of the respondents concurred with the fact that the ex-militants who received the amnesty package were not satisfied with it. A number of important events have signalled the dissatisfaction of a number of the ex-militants even after they had initially accepted the programme. There were a number reports of

abandonment of amnesty and a number of instances of renewed violence after the commencement of the amnesty programme (Oluwaniyi, 2011b).

As mentioned previously, this assertion has to be toned down as no ex-militants returned questionnaires. This assertion is also drawn from the research of Ikoh & Ukpong (2013) who carried out a survey on ex-militants.

### **5.7. THE SEEMING ABANDONMENT OF AMNESTY. WHY INSTANCES OF RENEWED VIOLENCE WERE REPORTED AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME**

The ex-militants in a study conducted by Ikoh and Ukpong (2013) described abandonment or desertion of amnesty from their personal experiences as being hinged on the failure of similar past programmes which were planned to bring improvement to the socio-economic wellbeing of Nigerians. Though the beneficiaries of the amnesty package were severally promised by government of its commitment to ensuring the success of the amnesty programme yet distrust and fear still pervaded the rank and file of these ex-militants and some felt uneasy with the terms and conditions of the offer and, hence, preferred to abandon the programme. In fact, the fear that the amnesty programme could fail like a number of the previous publicly advertised government programmes prevented many militants to openly embrace the amnesty offer at the early stage of the programme. In addition, some of the militia men thought the package was a strategy to gain time for the military to be well-equipped and positioned to confront the militants headlong but others viewed the offer as a ploy to make them renounce their commitment to the struggle for the emancipation of the oil rich region (Ikoh and Ukpong, 2013). Such thoughts pushed many of the militia men back to their abode in the creeks. A study shows that these alternative conclusions are not strange since as humans, we have the tendency

to stick to the path we have trod before when faced with uncertainty even under a programme where we have been named as benefactors (Heimer, 2001).

A number of factors have been identified to be responsible for the renewed violence reported after the commencement of the amnesty programme despite the huge promise of monetary sustenance and skill acquisition that the amnesty programme provided for the ex-militants. In the first instance, a number of the leaders of the different militant group had earlier said that the amnesty offer would be rejected by their members. This position must have been fueled by the need to resist any attempt to curtail their behaviours or their choices which falls in line with the observation of Curran and Renzetti which says that gang members will always resist any form of attempts to put a restraint on their conduct except any restraint being imposed by the leadership or fellow members of the gang ( Curran and Renzetti, 2001).

## **5.8. WHAT TO EXPECT SHOULD THE POST-AMNESTY PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS CONTINUES TO SUCCEED**

The evidence on ground in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria shows that amnesty has been a phenomena. The initiative has freed the oil-rich region from the clutch of all categories of militants and their destructive tendencies. While showing their might, the activities of the militants had drastically cut-down on oil production which remains the cash cow for the entire country of Nigeria (Obi, 2009). With the implementation of the amnesty programme, crude production has bounced back to its full capacity and investors who once fled the region have returned just as the ex-militants who were once viciously hostile to the country and oil production in the region have embraced the amnesty offer and are being reformed, re-orientated, and reintegrated into the civil society to be fellow citizens and stakeholders in the rebuilding of the region. As a new order appears to be taking root in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, would the prevailing peace devoid of suspicion, clamour and violence continue to hold into the future?

The amnesty office in Nigeria planned the amnesty programme to bring improvement to the human capital development of the Niger Delta region and the entire country as an entity. Several skill acquisition programmes have been introduced into the amnesty programme and a number of the ex-militants have benefited immensely from the human capacity development programmes organised both within and outside the country. If the post-amnesty programme continues to be well managed by the government and the Niger Delta region continues to receive attention from the government and the oil multinationals that operates in the region, the underdevelopment in the oil-rich region should soon be a thing of the past leading to continual peace in the region that was once known internationally as a troubled spot (Ikoh and Ukpong, 2013).

## **5.9. LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH STUDY**

As it is usually common to most research studies, this research project has some perceived limitations that should be taken into account when reading and interpreting the research data and the statistical results. The sample is not a representative of the entire population of the Niger Delta people but for the people who agreed to participate in the study. The number of respondents that actually responded is mentioned in the limitation however, it can be argued that the data collected is sufficient to use for analysis. Unfortunately, none of the ex-militants could be reached when the questionnaires were being distributed. This was a setback but not totally detrimental to the research study as other respondents are arguably just as important. They are important people who the amnesty programme excluded. In light of this, the study employed the use of case study comparisons, assessing how the South African and Sierra Leonean Governments used amnesty as a tool for conflict resolution compared to the Niger Delta Amnesty to draw conclusions.

The implication of ex-militants not being reached will mean that the conclusion of this research would not be taken as fact, rather subjective and there a need for a more decisive work to be carried out by future researchers. It is important to highlight that this does not invalidate the results from the responses gotten from the survey. The findings from this research study is a part of a larger picture. The hypothesis was formed based on points from works of other authors about ex-militants from interactions and interviews with them or consultants on their expectations. The data results alongside the literature reports builds a bigger picture for this study. In summary, primary data collection through the use of questionnaire was a part of the picture constructed in this research study, despite the limitations, the results fits with the research question and hypothesis.

## **6.0. RECOMMENDATIONS**

This final chapter concludes by providing necessary recommendations to future areas of research and the implications for policy and practice.

Looking at the findings of this study and the discussion that accompanied it, this study proffers the following recommendations:

- 1. A reform of the Amnesty Programme to address issues highlighted in this study**
  - a. Including other stakeholders:** Including other groups of people in not only focusing on just militants, there are also non-violent groups that were excluded and are susceptible to picking up arms for the same causes as the violent militants did in the past. Also important are other vulnerable stakeholders women and children whose means of livelihood (farming and fishing) were taken away by environmental pollution (e.g. water contamination caused by oil

spills). Having an all-inclusive approach will address root causes that lead to grievances that can destabilize the region's peace in the future.

- b. Better Implementation:** A major criticism of the amnesty programme has been its poor implementation of the actual recommendations that were contained in the report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee before the adoption of the amnesty programme. This needs to be re-addressed to have a more effective amnesty programme.
- c. Curbing Corruption:** An assessment of how the amnesty programme was being run in 2010 showed that 80% of its budget was spent on payments to consultants and contractors, leaving 20% allocated to the ex-militants for their rehabilitation (Oluwaniyi, 2011: Page 52). Another interesting fact is that between 2009 and 2011, \$819 million was allocated for just the amnesty programme. Majority of this, was share between the elites and leaders with some militants sent for educational training being stranded in some instances for lack of school fees funds (Badmus,2010).

Also this study would recommend a restructure of the amnesty programme to address developmental and environmental concerns in the region by phasing out the monetization of peace, to a phase which addresses real community grievances.

## **2. For the Federal Government to enforce stringent environmental clean-up laws**

To hold the oil companies to a standard, to ensure they are held accountable for any further oil spillages and environmental pollution cause by oil production and extraction activities.

**3. For the Federal Government to encourage the oil companies in host communities to improve their Corporate Social Responsibility as part of efforts to tackle underdevelopment.**

Ensuring through laws, that the oil companies in the host communities across the Niger Delta region, give back to these communities that have been adversely affected by the activities of the oil companies. Making it compulsory and more frequent (Badmus, 2010).

**4. Empowerment and Continual follow-up of the ex-militants for Sustained Progress**

The amnesty office has a responsibility to continue to ensure an unpretentious rehabilitation and the full reintegration of all the ex-militants into the society through constant follow up. Ex-militants who have successfully acquired requisite skills through the amnesty programme on skill acquisition and rehabilitation should be gainfully employed or helped to set up and manage their own small and medium scale business enterprises. Empowerment and continual follow-up will demonstrate the true and good intention of the amnesty office and the government for their welfare. A constant follow-up, periodic evaluation, and timely advice of these ex-militants could help to make them fully integrated and their source livelihood well-developed and sustained so that their attention will be completely off the allure of criminal activities in the creeks.

**5. Continual monitoring of the Niger Delta region and mopping up of weapons and illegal arms where necessary**

The continual presence of small arms and light weapons in the Niger Delta region poses potential threat to the fledging peace in the region. Therefore, mopping up of these small arms and weapons is necessary for peace to continue to reign in the region. The community members could help with effective intelligence gathering to know and



locate areas where arms are being stored against the spirit of the amnesty programme. Effective intelligence gathering could also provide early clues on the activities of ex-militant leaders and arm traffickers should there be any link.

#### **6. Commitment to the development of the Oil-rich Region**

There should be the political will to continually develop the infrastructural amenities within the Niger Delta area. This is necessary so that any rebellion to the post-amnesty peace building process will not be justified on the excuses of neglect or marginalization of the region. The development of the Niger Delta area should include such areas as the total protection of the Niger Delta environment, building of good roads and pipe borne water, and concerted efforts at conserving the natural resources of the region while continually reducing pollution. Some of these areas where developments are most needed falls within the initial demands of the Movement of the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) which led to the full scale militancy in the first instance when the demand for developmental needs were not met.

#### **7. Continual exercise to identify and empower youths that are at-risk of embracing militancy**

The Niger Delta being a wide region has several other youths who could be classified as at risk of embracing militancy but because they did not carry arms were excluded in the initial amnesty programme. Such youths could develop radical nature because of the perception that they have been deprived of their existence due to oil exploration in their area. Some of these youths are unemployed and, hence, chances are that they could begin to think of militancy to drive home their demands. Identifying this class of youths for engagement and empowerment with effective skill acquisition and empowerment programme that assures of financial sustainability. Also, identifying and empowering youths using this strategy could send a clear message that the amnesty programme is

not a reward for violence, and that could dissuade other youths from resorting to violent militancy.

#### **8. Making violent politics illegal**

Perhaps, there is the need to make laws that recognises violent politics as illegal. This is because arms struggle and violence in the Niger Delta had its root in political thuggery. As earlier discussed in this study, a number of studies indicates that many instances of hired assassination, abduction or kidnapping, and thuggery in the oil-rich region had its roots in violent politics.

### **6.1. CONCLUSION**

In bringing this study to a close, it is important to summarise the key findings made including from review of relevant literature and to take a look again at the key findings of scholars who have studied the amnesty offer and the possibility of peace reigning in the Niger Delta of Nigeria in the post-amnesty period.

The oil-rich Niger Delta is home to about 31 million Nigerians of more than forty ethnic groups was faced with violent uprisings which became more pronounced towards the end of the 1990s and early 2000s. Armed struggle in the Niger Delta region reached a crescendo with approximately 50 armed groups comprising about 20,000–25,000 armed youths brandishing sophisticated weapons during conflict (UNDP, 2007).

In 2007 alone, Nigeria sustained the highest levels of losses in oil revenues when crisis escalated and MEND targeted Shell, Agip and Chevron. It was estimated that the country lost about 675,000 bpd (barrels per day) which represent almost 27% of the 2.4 million bpd estimated daily production as at that time (Obi, 2009).

These intermittent violent uprisings led to the introduction of the amnesty programme in 2009 by the federal government of Nigeria. The primary goal of the amnesty programme was to offer

pardon to all individuals that have been involved with insurgency and armed struggle in the oil-rich region provided they laid down their weapons and embraced peace. Monetary rewards and skill acquisition trainings both in Nigeria and abroad were included in the amnesty offer granted to the ex-militants.

Authors looked at in the literature review had varying views and criticisms of the amnesty programme. Most authors were sceptical about the amnesty programme itself and whether it will bring any kind of peace, but from the research carried out. One of the major criticisms of the amnesty was that it was poorly implemented as indicated by Oludoro & Oludoro (2012). The argument put forward was that not only did it fail to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee, it also failed in its inability to engage the ex-combatants in a formal peace agreement. Instead a top down inclusive approach was adopted where negotiations were held with the Niger Delta elders and elites and leaders of the ex-combatants.

Exclusion is a persistent theme across this research project, the exclusion of ex-combatants in negotiations as well as the exclusion of vulnerable groups of people (women, children, grassroots community members) from the amnesty programme. This is in line with one of the main criticisms of the amnesty programme in this research study which argues that too much focus was placed on the militants. In trying to understand amnesty as a peace building mechanism, the use of case study analysis in South Africa and Sierra Leone was employed to compare to the Niger Delta amnesty. Although they bear no similarities as to the type of conflicts that occurred, vital lessons are to be learned from these countries. An important feature to emulate is that it not just focused on one party (perpetrators) but paid attention to the victims, this is in sharp contrast to the Niger Delta amnesty which focused solely on militants and majority of the people marginalised were excluded. They do not still benefit from the proceeds of oil just how other oil producing countries as Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and

Norway etc. provide for their citizens (Igini, 2011). Authors like Igini argue that there is a need for a holistic approach. The amnesty programme in Nigeria will be even more successful in sustaining peace if it is inclusive of other groups of people in these communities.

Another feature the Nigerian government may seek to emulate from the case studies of both countries discussed is the government's approach through the TRC to uncover the truth, a good means of gathering information that may become useful in implementing policies for conflict resolution and prevention. By gathering these information, it helps in understanding the historical root causes of why violence and conflict occurred. This is another area where the Niger Delta's amnesty programme has failed. The federal government failed to address the root causes of the violent conflicts, kidnappings, high levels of insecurity that was the norm before the implementation of the amnesty programme. These root causes were discussed with theories as the human capability theory where it was argued that there was a capabilities failure by the Nigerian Government as it was the responsibility of the state to ensure these capabilities (basic needs) were met. The Greed and Grievance theory as well as the Ethnicity theory was also discussed as a way of trying to understand why conflicts occur in regions such as the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta is home to about 31 million Nigerians with more than 40 ethnic minority groups, most who were excluded from the Amnesty Programme (Takon,2011).

People become marginalised and aggrieved overtime from the failure of the government to provide basic needs and come together collectively to address their grievances.

It is argued here that the amnesty programme needs to be reformed to ensure it includes other groups of people and not just the militants. Marginalised vulnerable groups are susceptible to taking up arms and joining militant groups for the same cause the ex- combatants joined.

The main findings of the research was that the amnesty programme could rationally be taken as adequate in bringing lasting peace to the troubled oil-rich region of the Niger Delta of

Nigeria but the non-adoption of bottom-up approach to the amnesty programme might significantly affect the post-amnesty peace-building process in the long run. The bottom up approach as discussed by authors like Ikoh and Ukpong (2013) and Oluwaniyi (201) argue that it provides an opportunity and an in depth understanding of the forces at work that eventually led to the conflict. The group of people who are the forces by these authors are the different categories of militants -genuine militants and criminalised militants (Ikelegbe, 2011). This research project agrees with these arguments but goes further with the argument that the bottom up approach should involve not only the different categories of militants but other groups of people especially the vulnerable groups that were overlooked by the amnesty programme implemented by the government.

The underlying difference with other authors that were sceptical about the amnesty programme ever bringing any kind of peace is that they saw it as a scheme implemented by the Federal Government to 'buy' peace. From the discussions including the findings drawn from the research survey, it is apparent that the Niger Delta amnesty programme is a laudable step which presents a lot of potential to bring lasting peace if the recommendations are followed. At the moment the Niger Delta region is peaceful with lower levels of insecurities and violent acts as kidnapping and attacks on oil pipelines however, issues of poor implementation, corruption and exclusion of other important stakeholders needs to be addressed for sustainable peace.

For future researchers, there is need for a more decisive work to be carried out. Research which includes all stakeholders not just militants or elites or militant leaders.

## APPENDICES

### **APPENDIX 1: Research Questionnaire**

#### **A Research Survey Questionnaire**

This questionnaire aims at collecting information for the overall evaluation of an MSc thesis titled: **“Evaluating Protracted Social Conflict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: An Analysis of the Challenges of the Post-Amnesty Peace-building Process”**

The goal of this research work being undertaken currently is to add to the body of research work on proffering time-tested solutions to protracted social conflicts in general and also contribute useful recommendations to the peace-building process being witnessed in the Niger Delta region at the moment.

**Note:** This questionnaire is being distributed to the following categories of people: local Niger Delta community members, local elites, ex-militants, staff of oil companies and oil servicing companies, military personnel, members of the media and civil society groups, officials of the Nigerian government and members of the diplomatic corps. We implore you to answer the questions as you deem appropriate.

**Are you an ex-militant?** Yes/No (Tick the one you think is appropriate)

#### **SECTION A (Socio-demographic factors)**

1. Age (Tick the age group that is appropriate for you):
  - 16-25
  - 26-35
  - 36-45
  - 46-55
  - 56-65
2. Gender: Male/Female
3. Occupation:
4. Education:
5. Marital status: Married/ single/divorced

#### **SECTION B**

**Instruction: Tick any one of the options A-E that you think is the most appropriate response for each of the following question.**

1. I consider the cumulative neglect of the Niger Delta as the main factor for militancy in the region.
  - A. Strongly agree
  - B. Agree
  - C. Disagree
  - D. Strongly disagree
  - E. Very strongly disagree
  
2. The Amnesty programme is not comprehensive enough and will not succeed in bringing lasting peace to the Niger Delta region
  - A. Strongly agree
  - B. Agree
  - C. Disagree
  - D. Strongly disagree
  - E. Very strongly disagree
  
3. The amnesty programme is adequate and would result in the development of the Niger Delta region
  - A. Strongly agree
  - B. Agree
  - C. Disagree
  - D. Strongly disagree
  - E. Very strongly disagree
  
4. The current amnesty programme will substantially improve the socio-economic conditions of the people of Niger Delta
  - A. Strongly agree
  - B. Agree
  - C. Disagree
  - D. Strongly disagree
  - E. Very strongly disagree
  
5. Small arms and light weapons are still currently prevalent in the Niger Delta creeks
  - A. Strongly agree
  - B. Agree
  - C. Disagree
  - D. Strongly disagree
  - E. Very strongly disagree
  
6. The arms mop-up exercise conducted as part of the amnesty programme was not effective in ridding the oil-rich region of weapons and would create huge insecurity problems in the near future.
  - A. Strongly agree
  - B. Agree
  - C. Disagree
  - D. Strongly disagree

- E. Very strongly disagree
7. The non-acceptance of amnesty offer by some militants will significantly affect post-amnesty peace-building process.
- A. Strongly agree
  - B. Agree
  - C. Disagree
  - D. Strongly disagree
  - E. Very strongly disagree
8. The small arms and light weapons still existing in the Niger Delta region are negligible and will not significantly affect the post-amnesty peace-building efforts.
- A. Strongly agree
  - B. Agree
  - C. Disagree
  - D. Strongly disagree
  - E. Very strongly disagree
9. The amnesty offer and the arms mop-up exercise were very effective and would help to prevent eruption of violence in the near future.
- A. Strongly agree
  - B. Agree
  - C. Disagree
  - D. Strongly disagree
  - E. Very strongly disagree
10. The non-inclusion of the militants in decision making prior launching the amnesty programme will not significantly affect the post-amnesty peace-building process.
- A. Strongly agree
  - B. Agree
  - C. Disagree
  - D. Strongly disagree
  - E. Very strongly disagree
11. The militants who accepted amnesty offer of the federal government were significantly satisfied with the amnesty package which includes the stipends and the skill-acquisition/empowerment programme.
- A. Strongly agree
  - B. Agree
  - C. Disagree
  - D. Strongly disagree
  - E. Very strongly disagree
12. The amnesty programme as being implemented currently will not significantly improve the well-being of the participants.
- A. Strongly agree
  - B. Agree
  - C. Disagree
  - D. Strongly disagree
  - E. Very strongly disagree



## APPENDIX 2: Statistical Analysis

Table 1: Hypothesis one

		Q3	Q2
Q3	Pearson Correlation	1	.402**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.006
	N	45	45
Q2	Pearson Correlation	.402**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.006	
	N	45	45

Table 2: Hypothesis two

		Q6	Q9
Q6	Pearson Correlation	1	.233
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.124
	N	45	45
Q9	Pearson Correlation	.233	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.124	
	N	45	45

Table 3: Hypothesis three

		Q7	Q8
Q7	Pearson Correlation	1	-.304*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.043
	N	45	45
Q8	Pearson Correlation	-.304*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.043	
	N	45	45

Table 4: Hypothesis four

		Q11	Q12
Q11	Pearson Correlation	1	-.421**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.004
	N	45	45
Q12	Pearson Correlation	-.421**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.004	
	N	45	45

Table 5: General Correlation Table

		Correlations											
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12
Q1	Pearson Correlation	1	.477**	.522**	-.403**	.283	-.008	.235	.418**	.158	.389**	-.054	.115
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.001	.000	.006	.060	.957	.120	.004	.299	.008	.723	.451
	N	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
Q2	Pearson Correlation	.477**	1	.402**	-.534**	-.029	-.072	.082	.364*	.042	.311*	-.363*	.108
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001		.006	.000	.852	.638	.592	.014	.782	.038	.014	.479
	N	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
Q3	Pearson Correlation	.522**	.402**	1	-.224	.327*	.008	.527**	-.027	.156	.442**	.424**	-.319*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.006		.139	.029	.960	.000	.862	.306	.002	.004	.033
	N	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
Q4	Pearson Correlation	-.403**	-.534**	-.224	1	.002	-.037	.221	-.295*	.084	-.139	.389**	-.067
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.006	.000	.139		.991	.809	.144	.049	.582	.364	.008	.661
	N	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
Q5	Pearson Correlation	.283	-.029	.327*	.002	1	.569**	.655**	-.424**	.473**	.026	.328*	-.288
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.060	.852	.029	.991		.000	.000	.004	.001	.864	.028	.055
	N	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
Q6	Pearson Correlation	-.008	-.072	.008	-.037	.569**	1	.400**	-.271	.233	-.322*	.038	-.368*

Q7	Sig. (2-tailed)	.957	.638	.960	.809	.000	.006	.072	.124	.031	.806	.013
	N	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
	Pearson Correlation	.235	.082	.527**	-.221	.655**	.400**	1	-.304*	.092	.237	.553**
Q8	Sig. (2-tailed)	.120	.592	.000	.144	.000	.006	.043	.546	.117	.000	.031
	N	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
	Pearson Correlation	.418**	.364*	-.027	-.295*	-.424**	-.271	.304*	1	.276	.353*	-.406**
Q9	Sig. (2-tailed)	.004	.014	.862	.049	.004	.072	.043	.066	.017	.006	.000
	N	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
	Pearson Correlation	.158	-.042	.156	.084	.473**	.233	.092	1	-.276	.053	-.114
Q10	Sig. (2-tailed)	.299	.782	.306	.582	.001	.124	.546	.066	.163	.727	.454
	N	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
	Pearson Correlation	.389**	.311*	.442**	-.139	.026	-.322*	.237	.353*	1	.172	.138
Q11	Sig. (2-tailed)	.008	.038	.002	.364	.864	.031	.117	.163	.258	.365	
	N	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	
	Pearson Correlation	-.054	-.363*	.424**	.389**	.328*	.038	.553**	-.406**	.053	.172	1
Q12	Sig. (2-tailed)	.723	.014	.004	.008	.028	.806	.006	.727	.258	.004	.004
	N	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
	Pearson Correlation	.115	.108	-.319*	-.067	-.288	-.368*	.323*	.608**	.114	.138	-.421**
Q12	Sig. (2-tailed)	.451	.479	.033	.661	.055	.013	.031	.454	.365	.004	.004
	N	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

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